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AN ANALYSIS OF PERCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARENTS,
TEACHERS, PRINCIPALS, SUPERINTENDENTS, AND SCHOOL
BOARD MEMBERS RELATING TO ISSUES IMPORTANT
TO MERIT PAY IMPLEMENTATION
Abstract of Dissertation
Purpose: Within school districts groups may be identified
whose function influences their perceptions about what would
occur in the schools relative to issues important to merit
pay implementation. The purpose of the study was to identify
those differences that exist between groups regarding issues
relevant to merit pay implementation.
Procedures: Parents, teachers, principals, superintendents,
and school board members were drawn from elementary, high
school, and unified school districts residing in regions
designated by the Association of California School Administrators. A survey instrument was developed in order to
elicit group responses about issues related to merit pay.
Analyses of variance were carried out to test the hypotheses
relating to: a) differences between groups and b)
differences between dimensions identified for the study.
In
addition, an analysis of individual items and pertinent
supplementary analyses were carried out.
Results: Teachers rejected the premise that merit pay would
improve educational productivity and benefit school community
members.
Principals were cognizant of the relationship
between motivational principles and merit pay, and expressed
confidence that the reinforcement principles related to
merit pay would be carried out. All groups were confident
that school administrators would maintain an effective meritpay program. However, the groups were uncertain about what
evaluation procedures would be employed; the effect merit pay
would have on incompetent teachers; and how incompetent
teachers' performance would be improved.
Conclusions: At this time, the data examined suggest that
merit pay implementation should be delayed until those
differences identified between groups are reconciled.
This does not imply that merit pay implementation should be
abandoned, but rather, each issue should be examined and
acted upon carefully.
Recommendations:
Those school districts considering merit
pay implementation should give consideration to the development of standards specifying what the school district's
outcomes are to be. Within the context of outcomes, the
development of evaluation procedures that link merit-pay
awards to outcomes is essential. Therefore, in order to
establish trust and cooperation within the school district,
recognizable links between performance outcomes and the
merit-pay awards are to be firmly established.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Merit pay as a strategy to be used for the
improvement of educational services, notably teacher
performance, has resurfaced and has become a public and
political issue as well as an educational issue.

Merit pay,

however, remains a controversial issue with sides drawn as
to the strategies to be employed and the acceptability of
merit pay implementation in the schools.
School districts, as open systems, are influenced by
national politics and various professional organizations.
At the local level, school districts may be divided into
five principal groups based on the function of each group
in the school districts' operation.

Within each group,

the perceptions held, with regards to merit pay, will vary
relative to the group's function, national political
policies, and affiliations with organizations representing
each group.
However desirable merit pay may be from

a

theoretical view, a number of considerations should be
analyzed prior to the installation of merit-pay programming
in the schools.

Five dimensions play a role in the success

or failure of merit-pay programs.

These are:

a) moti-

·vational factors influencing decisions to implement
merit-pay programs in the schools; b) psychological
1
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determinants influencing improved teacher performance; c)
evaluation criteria to be employed for the measurement of
teacher performance relating to merit-pay awards; d)
alternative financial strategies relating to the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers; and e) school
administrative responsibilities related to successful merit
pay implementation.
In order to assure the successful installation of
merit-pay programs in the schools, an analysis of these
dimensions, relative to the school district's members'
perceptions, should be carried out.

In effect, agreement

among parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and
school board members, with regards to the efficacy of
merit-pay programming, must be clarified.
The Problem
Statement of the Problem
Two factors influence the individual's decision to
accept or reject merit-pay programming.

Lawler (1971),

reviewing data collected by Beer and Gery, concluded that
·individuals' needs and the situation in which they find
themselves influence their preferences for merit-pay
programming.

Therefore, the problem of this study was to

determine if parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and school board members' perceptions are in
agreement with regards to:

a) motivational factors

influencing decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the

3

schools; b) psychological determinants influencing improved
teacher performance; c) evaluation criteria to be employed
for the measurement of teacher performance relating to
merit-pay awards; d) alternative financial strategies
related to the improvement of functionally incompetent
teachers; and e) school administrative responsibilities
related to merit pay implementation as they perceive what
would occur in the schools relative to issues comprising
each dimension.
Purpose of the Study
Merit pay has become a recurrent theme perceived as
a strategy for increasing educational outcomes through the
improvement of teacher performance.

What is not clear, is

how parents, teachers, principals, superintendents and
school board members perceive what would occur in the
schools relative to issues relevant to the successful
implementation of merit-pay programs in the schools.
Two principal reasons necessitate the determination
of the respondents' perceptual response patterns for each
of the dimensions identified and the elements within each
dimension.

First, the dimensions are interdependent to the

extent each dimension must be positively valenced, favorable
to merit pay implementation.

Second, the respondents'

perceptual response patterns are interdependent in that
agreement among the respondent classifications--parents,
teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board
members--must exist in order to assure successful merit pay
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implementation.
Therefore, the purpose of the study was to identify
those points of agreement and disagreement within each
respondent classification and among the respondent
classifications.

Once these response patterns are

identified and analyzed, decisions, as to whether efforts
should be made to reconcile the identified differences or
to abandon merit-pay programming, can be .made.

To do

otherwise would lead to erroneous assumptions that could
result in unsuccessful merit pay implementation and
probable adversive effects on

ex~sting

teacher performance.

Hypotheses of the Study
Fundamental to the successful implementation of a
sound merit-pay program is:

a) parents, teachers, princi-

pals, superintendents, and school board members must have
perceptual response patterns that agree with respect to each
dimension; and b) each dimension identified in the following
hypotheses must have a positive valence favorable to the
implementation of the merit-pay program selected.

The

hypotheses of the study are:
Hypotheses 1:

There are no differences among

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions about what would occur in
the schools relative to dimensions identified for the study.
Hypothesis 1 :
1

There are no differences among

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would
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occur in the schools relative to the motivational factors
influencing decisions to implement merit-pay programs in
the schools.
Hypothesis 1 :
2

There are no differences among

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would
occur in the schools relative to the psychological
determinants influencing improved teacher performance.
Hypothesis 1 :
3

There are no differences among

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would
occur in the schools relative to the evaluation criteria to
be employed for the measurement of teacher performance
relating to merit-pay awards.
Hypothesis 1 :
4

There are no differences among

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what
would occur in the schools relative to the alternative
strategies related to the improvement of functionally
incompetent teachers.·
Hypothesis 1 :
5
parents',

teach~rs',

There are no differences among

principals', superintendents', and

school board members' perceptions with regards to what
would occur in the schools relative to the school
administrative responsibilities related to merit pay
implementation.
Hypotheses 2:

There are no differences among the
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following dimensions as the respondents perceive what would
occur in the schools with regards to issues relevant to
merit-pay programming.

The dimensions are:

a) motivational

factors influencing decisions to implement merit-pay
programs in the schools; b) psychological determinants
influencing improved teacher performance; c) evaluation
criteria to be employed for the measurement of teacher
performance relating to merit-pay awards; d) alternative
financial strategies related to the improvement of
functionally incompetent teachers; and e) school administrative responsibilities related to merit pay
implementation.
Hypothesis 2 :
1

There are no differences among

the dimensions listed above with regards to the parents'
perceptions about what would occur in the schools relative
to each dimension.
Hypothesis 2 :
2

There are no differences among

the dimensions listed above with regards to the teachers'
perceptions about what would occur in the schools relative
to each dimension.
Hypothesis 2 :
3

There are no differences among

the dimensions listed above with regards to the principals'
perceptions about what would occur in the schools relative
to each dimension.
Hypothesis 2 :
4

There are no differences among

the dimensions listed above with regards to the
superintendents' perceptions about what would occur in the
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schools relative to each dimension.
Hypothesis 2 :
5

There are no differences among

the dimensions listed above with regards to the school
board members' perceptions about what would occur in the
schools relative to each dimension.
Significance of the Study
Research in the area of merit pay has been limited
in quantity and perspective as related to education.

Those

discussions relating to merit pay have frequently referred
to research conducted outside of education or reflect
opinions held by

var~ous

writers.

This study provides a

multi-dimensional collection and analysis of individuals'
responses focusing on the school community's concepts about
what would occur in the schools relative to issues important
to successful merit pay implementation.
The implementation of merit-pay programs has
ramifications that are far reaching and have an effect on
those participants that make up the school community.
Frequently, programs are developed and implemented that have
not been well thought-out nor has sufficient consideration
been given to those groups that have an investment in the
program implemented.
Parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and
school board members have different interests that need to
be served.

However, the success of merit-pay programs

require that these participants reconcile those differences
that may exist among them.

This study addresses those

8

points of agreement and disagreement that may exist among
parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and school
board members.
Definition of Terms
The terms used in this study are defined as follows:
Achievement motivation--behavior that is not easily
motivated by extrinsic rewards, such as money or symbols
of awards; performance is motivated when

m~asured

against

some standard of excellence.
Incentive--the product of an externally applied
stimulus.

This stimulus provides the promise of some

reward which is regarded as having value.
Incentive wages--wages received by an employee for
the accomplishment of a specific quantity and/or quality of
production task.

See Merit Pay.

Incentive wage system--a plan of wage payment that
relates wages of employees to effort and output, either
individually or as a group.
Mentor teacher--a teacher selected whose duties are
to assist and guide new teachers, assist other teachers,
provide staff development and develop special curriculum.
In California, the mentor teacher must teach at least
60% of the time.
Merit pay--one of the classes of incentive payments
that awards extra compensation based on observed performance
increments but are ancillary to the primary wage scale.
Merit evaluation--measurement of educational
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productivity or effectiveness through which employees are
ranked for purposes of distributing merit-pay increments.
Salary--compensation received by an employee for
services rendered during a specified time.
Wages--compensation of employees receiving a stated
sum per piece, hour, day, or any other unit or period.
Usually it is all compensation paid including salaries.
Methodology
The procedures set forth for the study are
described under the following headings.

They are:

1)

Population Sample; 2) Research Methodology; 3) Instrument;
and 4) Analysis of the Data.
Population Sample
The participants for the study were parents,
teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board
members drawn from elementary, high school, and unified
school districts residing in 16 of 18 regions designated by
the Association of California School Administrators (ACSA
Members Handbook, 1983-1984).

Two regions were omitted

because they did not meet the criteria establishing that
each region have an elementary school district, high school
district, and unified school district.
Research Methodology
The school districts selected for the study were
randomly drawn using stratified random sampling procedures.
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Within each school district, the parents, teachers, and
school board members were assigned a computer generated
random number, which was to be used by the superintendents
as a means for selecting respondents in their school
districts.

Each principal was preselected and drawn from

the 1984 California Public School Directory prior to the
distribution of the survey instrument.

The selection of

superintendents corresponded with the selection of the
school districts.
A query letter was mailed to the Superintendents
of each school district selected for the study.

Upon

receiving confirmation that they would participate in the
study, a packet containing:

a) a letter identifying the

study; b) respondents to be selected; c) selection and
distribution procedures; d) provisions for recording the
respondents; and e) reaffirmation that the results of the
study would be provided, was returned to each Superintendent.
In the event a Superintendent did not wish to participate in
the study, a substitute school district was selected.
Instrument
In the absence of an instrument to meet the
objectives of the study, a survey instrument was constructed.
The instrument consisted of issues relevant to merit pay
implementation and were categorized according to five
dimensions.

The dimensions were:

1) Motivational Factors

Influencing Decisions to Implement Merit-pay Programs in the
Schools; 2) Psychological Determinants Influencing Improved
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Teacher Performance; 3) Evaluation Criteria to be Employed
for the Measurement of Teacher Performance Relating to
Merit-pay Awards; 4) Alternative Financial Strategies
Related to the Improvement of Functionally Incompetent
Teachers; and 5) School Administrative Responsibilities
Related to Merit Pay Implementation.

The items were drawn

from issues directly addressed in the review of the
literature or related to an issue discussed.
Analysis of the Data
In order to test the hypotheses established for the
study, five single factor analyses of variance were conducted to determine if differences existed between groups by
dimension; also, five single factor repeated measures
analyses of variance were conducted to determine if
differences existed between dimensions within groups.

In

addition to the analyses of variance, Fisher's Least
Significant Differences procedures were used to determine
which group means or dimension means differed when the
analyses of variance rejected the null hypotheses.
Under the assumption that individual item response
differences would not be detected by the analyses of
variance, an analysis of individual items was carried out.
Supplementary analyses were conducted with regards to the
respondents' definition of merit pay, how the respondents'
perceived merit pay would affect employee relations, sex
differences, and age differences, whenever these
distinctions could be made.
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Organization of the Study
Presented in Chapter 1 are the problem, purpose and
procedures of the study.

Chapter 2 contains the review of

the literature, and Chapter 3 includes the research design
and procedures of the study.

A presentation and analysis of

the data is included in Chapter 4.

The conclusions,

discussion, and recommendations for future research are
given in Chapter 5.

Chapter 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Merit-pay programming, although not new to
education, has not played, in recent years, a significant
role in the school districts' compensation planning
practices.

However, those districts giving consideration to

merit pay implementation must evaluate several dimensions
that play an important role in the merit-pay program's
success or failure.

Essentially, successful merit pay

implementation rests upon the degree of agreement among
parents, teachers, principals, superintendents and school
board members with regards to:

a) who will benefit from

merit-pay programming; b) the appropriate psychological
preconditions necessary to facilitate the effectiveness of
merit-pay programs; c) decisions relating to performance
evaluations; d) effective alternative incentive programs
focusing on teacher incompetence; and e) school administrative responsibilities ensuring effective merit-pay program
implementation.
Although, merit pay as a concept, more pay for
improved performance, suggests a relatively simple method
for ·improving teacher performance, merit pay implementation
requires a careful examination of numerous factors that will
affect the merit pay program's effectiveness.

Prior to

merit pay implementation, those factors that are critical
13
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to successful merit' pay implementation are to be identified
and evaluated within the context of personal and
organizational expectations.

By clearly identifying these

factors and clarifying those points of agreement and
disagreement among parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board members, decisions can be made.
about the feasibility of merit pay implementation in the
schools.
Each member of the school community contributes to
the achievement of the school's goals in different ways.
These may be examined as mutually exclusive events, but
directed towards the same end, the educational development
of students.

Within the context of the school's function,

merit-pay program design should account for those
differences relative to the role played by each member of
the school community.
effectiveness of a

In order to maximize the potential

merit~pay

plan, identification of those

differences that may exist among parents, teachers,
principals, superintendents, and school board members is
required.
The preceding issues and related items are discussed
under the following dimension categories in this chapter.
They are:

1)

Motivational Factors Influencing Decisions to

Implement Merit-pay Programs in the Schools; 2) Evaluation
Criteria to be Employed for the Measurement of Teacher
Performance Relating to Merit-pay Awards; 3) Psychological
Determinants Influencing Improved Teacher Performance;
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4) Alternative Financial Strategies Relating to the
Improvement of Functionally Incompetent Teachers; and 5)
School Administrative Responsibilities Related to Merit Pay
Implementation.
Motivational Factors Influencing
Decisions to Implement Merit-pay
Programs in the Schools
Political Entities.
systems are influenced by:

School districts as open
a) political entities either

seeking ways to retain their political position or b) by
political entities whose political contribution is directed
at assisting the school districts achieve their educational
outcomes.

Van Zwoll (1964) suggested the following as

motives for endorsing merit pay in the schools.

First, the

motive to endorse the merit-pay concept may be to draw
favorable attention to the political entity or second, to
divert attention from the installation of favored programs
not generally acceptable to the public.

In either case,

Van Zwoll contended, the intent is not to primarily improve
instruction.

Furthermore, Kempner (1983) referring to the

political process observed, "it is unwise to assume that
people [or groups] rise to greater heights of selflessness
or self sacrifice"

(p. 55).

Teacher Organizations.

In response to the Presi-

dent, other political figures, and political groups, the
National Education Association (NEA) criticized the motives
underlying the endorsement of merit-pay programs in the
schools by suggesting that their motives are politically
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self-serving (NEA Memo, 1983).

Rather than endorsing

merit-pay programming, the NEA favors general salary
increases designed to attract and retain qualified teachers.
Kennedy (1971), Belcher (1974), Sibson (1981) and others
have pointed out that those

objecti~ns

and counter-proposals

raised by unions to merit-pay programs are related to:
a) maintaining equity among employees or b) maintaining
control over various management perogatives.

By placing an

emphasis on general salary increases, the NEA is able to
satisfy the above and maintain the support of its
membership.

With regards to this point, Uzell (1983)

contended, the NEA, "knows he is not there to represent the
minority of superior teachers but the vast majority of
nonsuperior teachers"

(p. 24).

In essence, the NEA strongly opposes merit pay
implementation in the schools primarily because merit-pay
awards, by design, will not be distributed to all teachers.
Instead of block distributions of salary increases that are
the same for each level based on senority, the NEA argues
that merit pay prepresents increases that are pyramidal in
form

(NEA Memo, 1983).

That is, as the apex of the pyramid

is approached, fewer teachers will receive increases.
However, the fundamental purpose of merit-pay programs is
to stimulate improved performance of all employees, not
specifically to reward existing performance excellence.

In

contrast to the pyramidal distribution of financial rewards
as described by the NEA, an inverted pyramidal distribution
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of financial rewards is conceivable, provided management has
the desire to support the teacher's increased financial
success, as well as achieve improved educational productiveness.

The American Federation of Teachers (AFT), similarily,

does not openly endorse merit-pay programming.

But, in

contrast to the NEA, recognizes that merit pay will be an
issue to be dealt with during negotiations with some school
districts.

As a consequence of this awareness, tne AFT has

defined the conditions under which merit-pay programming is
acceptable.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

These are:
substantially higher pay for all teachers.
negotiated evaluation procedures that offer
protection against subjectivity and local
school politics.
no sanctions against teachers who do not
receive extra pay.
an appeal and review procedure for teachers
who are not selected for merit pay.
eligibility for extra pay available to all
teachers.
any extra pay or status should not be
subject to diminution.
evaluation plans should not be simplistic
or based merely on student achievement tests
but reflect the complexity of all the
factors contributing to teacher and student
success.
plans should only be adopted if they are
acceptable through the collective bargaining
process.
(American Teacher, 1983, p. 23)

Parents.

Two principal issues have led education

reformers to perceive merit pay implementation as a remedy
for the schools' poor performance.

These are:

a)

dissatisfaction with educational institutions (Newton,
1982), and b) the inability of the schools to compete with
the private sector (Education USA, 1984).

Given that
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dissatisfaction with educational institutions stems from
poor performance by capable teaching personnel, merit pay is
a viable consideration.

Should the attraction and retention

of quality teaching personnel be the issue, merit pay is, at
best, only a partial solution.

Careful analysis and

determination of teacher quality is imperative in order to
make correct decisions relating to the methods of compensation required to improve teacher performance.

An attempt

to present confused or misrepresented purposes for or
against merit pay implementation, without realistic
assessment of teacher quality, will further erode the
support for education by parents, who, according to Newton
(1982) are already skeptical of current performance
evaluation practices.
Two important points have been identified regarding
parents' opinions relating to merit pay and accompanying
increased finances for education.

First, according to the

1983 Gallup Poll and Newsweek poll, 61 and 80 percent of the
parents respectively indicate support for merit pay
implementation in the schools.

Second, 70 percent of the

parents surveyed by the Gallup Poll indicated they would be
willing to pay higher taxes if it would raise the standard
of education.

There appears to be reasonable evidence to

suggest that public support for

~erit

pay implementation

exists, provided the increases granted to teachers are
related to increased performance.

This last point is

especially critical to the effective implementation of
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merit-pay programs.

The costs of merit pay implementatiqn

are high and justifiable only if accompanying gains in
performance warrant the costs.

Sibson (1981) pointed out

that the relative costs, when corresponding performance
increases occur, are low.

Sibson, Lawler (1974), and others

have also pointed out that the relative costs of merit pay
implementation are excessive and wasteful when the
objectives of merit pay implementation do not correspond to
improved performance.
On the negative side, however, Friedman (1983)
contended merit pay in the schools will not work because;
parents do not directly pay for the services as is the case
in the private sector.

Thus, parents are unable to control

the school districts in order to make their wants heard.
Belcher (1974) has suggested in contrast, public policy sets
the floors and sometimes the ceilings on financial rewards
even though the public does not play a role in the internal
distribution of rewards.
Teachers.

Teachers over the past years have

developed a distrust for merit-pay programming.

However,

according to the National School Board Association survey,
approximately two-thirds of those teachers surveyed favored
payment plans based upon classroom performance (NSBA, 1983) .
Stress on classroom performance results from the criticism
frequently made by teachers, as well as employees in the
private sector, that merit-pay increments are frequently
distributed on.the basis of factors other than performance--
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essentially favoritism.
Assessment of the NSBA findings requires further
analysis in light of interest expressed in the application
of the merit-pay concept in education.

A number of

variables have been identified that-impact on beliefs
workers in the private sector hold with regards to merit
pay.

These are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

incentive plans result in speed up,
rates will be cut if increased earnings are
made under the plan,
incentive plans encourage competition among
workers and the discharge of slow workers,
incentive plans result in unemployment through
working yourself out of a job,
workers do not get their share of increased
productivity,
incentive plans are too complex,
standards are set unfairly,
earnings fluctuations make it difficult to
budget household expenditures,.
incentive plans incr~ase the strain on the
worker and may impair his health,
incentive plans are used to avoid a deserved
wage increase,
incentive plans increase the frequency of
method changes,
incentive plans ask workers to do more than
a "fair days work," and
incentive plans imply a lack of trust in
workers by management.
(Belcher, 1974, p. 309)

In addition to the above deterrents to successful
merit pay implementation, teachers and teacher associations
frequently cite the following as a basis for not accepting
merit-pay programming.
of merit-pay increases.

First, inequity in the distribution
Second, evaluation procedures are

either nonexistent and/or difficult to develop.

Third,

security in the form of wage increments for all teachers
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rather than a select few.

Collectively, whether the

teacher perceives merit-pay programming as a vehicle for
gaining personal benefits is a function of the above
variables influence with reference to:

a) organizational

motive; b) organizational ability to administer the program
appropriately.; and c) how teachers needs are satisfied
within the organization.
In general, merit-pay programs are to be designed to
recognize and reward those exceptional performers who
contribute to the organization's outcomes in a significant
way.

Van Zwoll (1964) and Newman and Logan (1976) have

indicated negative aspects found in some merit-pay programs
directed at:

a) maintaining a ceiling on salary increases

and b) exploitation of the worker.

Essentially, effective

merit-pay programs should be designed to eliminate the
perceived manipulation of the employees and according to
Townsend (1984), maximize the program's motivational
potential by eliminating suspicion, loss of understanding,
and loss of trust.
Evaluation Criteria to be Employed
for the Measurement of Teacher Performance Relating to Merit-pay Awards
Explicit to the merit pay concept is that the
measures used for determining merit-pay eligibility are
performance.

Sibson stated, "Therefore, the first essential

step in any merit-pay program is supervisory evaluation of
employee performance"

(1981, p. 104).

This position is in

contrast to evaluations for employment, retention, and
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dismissal, which may include a number of factors, of which,
performance is only one factor.
The key to rewarding performance is to make correct
judgements about it.

This implies that the exact method by

which performance is rated does not matter as long as it
gets valid results (Sibson, 1984) .

Caution must be taken,

however, not to confuse performance measurements that
relate to merit-pay awards with general evaluative measurements.

With regards to performance rating, the issue is not

a question of subjective versus objective measurements, but
failure to design performance measures specific to merit-pay
programming (Sibson, 1981).

Newman and Logan (1976) identi-

fied five conditions that are important to the design of
effective incentive wage policies.
1.
2.

3.
4.

4.

These are:

The final results must truly reflect the effect
of the worker.
All important elements that are subject to the
control of the worker should either be included
in the compensation plan or controlled for by
other means.
The method of computing must be simple enough
so that employees can readily understand it.
The effect of good performance on the amount
of compensation should become apparent quickly
so that the worker realizes the importance of
good performance.
The confidence and cooperation of the employee
should be secured.
(Newman and Logan, 1976,
p. 245)

Two organizational factors may influence the type of
evaluation strategies employed by service organizations.
First, since schools are service institutions and typically
paid out of budget, their emphasis will be on behaviors that
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assure protection of the budget (Drucker, 1974).

Drucker

added, this behavior centers around "good intentions and
programs," rather than what produces the contribution.
Second, Anthony (1981), relating to government and education, suggested that the reason for continued "fuzzy"
performance measures result from not putting enough time or
effort required for the development of better performance
measures.

Given the opinions of Drucker (1974), Ingster

(1972), and others, unions and employee associations do
little to bring about changes resulting in precise performance measures.

According to Ingster (1972) unions (and

employee associations) are particularly opposed to the use
of performance appraisals for making administrative
decisions about promotions, layoffs, or wage increases.

He

added, unions contend that more experienced workers are
more effective because of their familiarity with the job to
be done.
work"

In effect, "Unions say long service means better

(Ingster, 1972, p. 5-27).

Shils (1972) also pointed

out that unions favor the principle of job difficulty and
responsibility as the criteria for more pay.

However,

through collective bargaining in the schools, Uzell,

(1983)

contended that the emphasis would continue to be more pay
for more work rather than more pay for better work.
Linking organizational

exgectatirm~s_(_Cas_te~tter_, _____

1981) and the conditions set forth by Newman and Logan
(1976) with the emphasis on performance provides a basis for
determining those teacher performances that are measurable
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within the context of merit-pay programming.

The thrust

behind the establishment of performance measures lies
simply in the recognition that different evaluation
strategies are required to satisfy different objectives-where performance objectives are different in focus than are
membership objectives (Belcher, 1974).
Measurement of employee performance, relative to
merit pay, are to be based on "results" (Haworth, 1972) or,
in other words, "outputs" rather than "inputs" (Belcher,
1974).

Thus, Belcher added, an assumption can be made that

one or a few measurements of out.put represents the performance contributions required by the organization.
White (1983) argued that there was no one best
system of instruction, and the definition of what makes an
effective or outstanding teacher for the comparison of
teachers is fraught with problems.

White's position differs

from Haworth and Belcher in emphasis.

According to the

distinction between inputs and outputs, methods of
instruction and teacher attributes represent inputs through
which outputs are assumed to follow.

In the researcher's

opinion, a counter argument may be proposed pointing out
that although method and outcomes are associated, there is
no assurance that this association holds for all cases.

In

addition, evaluations based on method may, in fact, be
biased by the evaluator's preference of one method over
another, despite the fact, that alternative methods achieve
the same or improved results (outputs).

A more consistent
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evaluative procedure would be to determine those outputs to
be achieved which are important to the organization, and
then measure performance relative to these outputs.
However, the NEA and the AFT appear to reject performance
measures relating to the performance of students which is
the measure of teacher effectiveness in terms of output--to
cause a change in student behavior.

Haworth (1972) has

pointed out, relative to the above discussion that incentive
plans are designed to play a causal role as well as reward
the effect.

Essentially, merit pay focuses on the payment

of performance only, whereas membership pay focuses on the
attributes (inputs)

that the individual brings into the

organization, of which, performance is only one
consideration.
Within the scope of the preceding discussions, much
of the conflict evolving around what is to be evaluated and
who will do the evaluations, can be eliminated through the
communication of expectations and the degree that these
expectations can be met, relative to teacher performance.
Haworth (1972)

stressed that the incentive plan provides a

basis for communication not found in other compensation
components.

Dinsmore (1972) extends this position further,

emphasizing that the incentive plan is a system of
communication as well as a system of Compensation.

In

effect, a communication link established among the
constituents within the school district would allow the
identification of the criteria that is to make the
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school district's evaluation procedures.
accomplished by:

This can be

a) parents and school board members

establishing the school district's performance expectations;
b) principals and central office administrators clarifying
the reality of achieving those performance objectives in
relationship to the availability of personnel and
resources; and c) teachers defining those work elements that
are under their direct control.

By clearly defining the

school district's performance expectations and determination
of those performance expectations that are achievable by
which the teacher is solely responsible, it is the opinion
of the researcher that teacher performance evaluation can be
carried out by representatives from each of the school
district's special interest groups, provided the measures
used for teacher evaluation are performance outputs not
performance inputs.
Psychological Determinants
Influencing Improved Teacher
Performance
Compensation programs developed and implemented by
school districts have focused primarily on salary considerations and collateral benefits; whereas, organizations
outside education, frequently include incentive payments as
a necessary component of the total compensation package.
Should school districts decide to implement merit-pay
programming, three separate but interrelated components
are to be analyzed prior to the district's announcement of
their total compensation policy.
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Salary, collateral benefits, and incentive payments
have distinct focal points that should be clearly recognized
in order to prevent confusion and misunderstandings, and to
serve as a basis for decisions regarding evaluation
strategies.

Salaries represent periodic payments made to

employees, represent fixed costs to the organization, and
are the basis for administering other forms of compensation
(Sibson, 1981).

Collateral benefits as defined by

Castetter are:
direct or indirect forms of compensation initiated
by the board of education generally on the behalf
of all personnel, which do not require additional
services to be performed.
(1981, p. 36)
Merit pay, a form of incentive payment, represents those
payments made in recognition for performances that exceed
the organizations's basic performance requirements.
Fundamentally, total compensation programs serve a
number of purposes.

First, compensation is a management

method that contributes to the effective management of the
organization (Sibson, 1981).

Second, competitive compen-

sation programs enhance the organization's ability to
attract, retain, and motivate employees.

Third, reasonable

wage levels increase the effectiveness of incentive-pay
pr6grams installed as part of the organization's total
compensation program (Haworth, 1972).

Fourth, as a reward,

compensation can be used to make employees feel satisfied
with their job and gain their commitment to the
organization (Lawler, 1971).

Fifth, sound compensation
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programs account for the employee's perceptions as to how
their standard of living is affected (Dunn and Rachel,
1976), their status in society (Castetter, 1981), the
employee's self esteem and their perceived worth to the
organization (Sibson, 1981) .
Currently, emphasis in the schools is placed
primarily on basic salary considerations, which include
extra-duty benefits, and collateral benefits.

Generally

speaking, salaries possess incentive value, but primarily
focus on the attraction of new employees and the retention
of those currently employed by the school district by
providing satisfying salary structures.
(1971)

stresse~

However, Lawler

that pay satisfaction does not influence

performance very strongly and should not be a major
consideration when pay satisfaction is discussed.
Collateral benefits, according to Brunker (1982), have
generally represented rewards for membership in the
organization rather than for performance.

Furthermore,

Lawler (1971) pointed out that employees do not always
value the fringe benefits they receive.

Assuming that

current salary structures are reasonably set, including
collateral benefits, incentive payments as a method for
improving teacher performance in the school district need to
be examined.
Two principal reasons underlying the rationale for
including incentive payments as part of the total compensation package are:

a) to motivate increased teacher
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performance, usually above the standard of acceptable
performance set forth during salary determination, and b)
to reward those teachers who perform above the acceptable
standard.

Using the distinction between performance and

learning made by Tolman (1949) and Bandura

(1~74),

incentive

plans may be examined either as performance-based plans or
learning-b~sed plans.

Performance-based ~lans indlude

merit-pay programs and other financial or nonfinancial plans
that directly reward improved performance.

Learning-based

plans include master teacher/career ladder and mentor
teacher plans in which emphasis is on the acquisition of
new knowledge and skills.

Payment is made principally on

these new acquisitions and increased performance is presumed
to be a result of these knowledge and skill acquisitions.
(See Alternative Financial Strategies Related to the
Improvement of Functionally Incompetent Teachers.)
Merit-pay systems, as performance-based plans, are
seen from a management perspective as, "management practices
designed to relate differences in pay for the same job to
differences in work performance"

(Sibson, 1981) .

In effect,

merit-pay programming means giving a superior performer a
wage increase and denying a poor performer a similar
increase (Anthony, 1981).

Alternatively, from an employee's

perspective, merit-pay programming gives the employee an
opportunity to earn more in relation to their increased
performance, where, according to Dunn and Rachel (1974),
"differences in ability, motivation, and output are
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automatically recognized and rewarded accordingly" (p. 241).
Haworth (1972) described effective incentive-payment
plans as those systems that clearly define the results to be
achieved; carry out periodic reporting; build a desire for
remedial improvement; and establish communications to a
degree not possible in most other compensation package
components.

A number of prerequisites have been identified

that are necessary for effective incentive-pay plans.

The

following prerequisites are comprehensive and include
elements identified by other writers.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

They are:

Adequate competitive floors (salary and wage)
and security areas (benefits) on top of which
incentives can produce variable inco~es.
Significant individual or group impact on
important results.
Measurable results.
Reasonable time spans.
Management committment to the program.
A salubrious climate in which striving
towards group or individual excellence
is applauded.
(Haworth, 1972, p. 7-5)

Organizations that have not implemented some form of
incentive pay program must rely solely on salaries and
collateral benefits as the primary incentives to induce
increased performance.

The weakness to be found in the use·

of salaries and collateral benefits as incentives directed
at improving performance, lies in the fact, that the
performance expectations are predetermined, and the ability
to increase performance is severely limited.

Three major

reasons contribute to these restrictions on salary and
collateral benefits as effective incentives.

First, the
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performance expectancies are set by mutual agreement between
management and employee.

That is, the salary represents

what management is willing to pay, or able to pay, for the
performance expected and the employee's rate of production
in turn for a specified salary.

Second, salaries and

collateral benefits have become rights that accrue as a
condition of employment.

Third, salaries do not

specifically relate to performance but include other
factors.

Therefore, adjusting salary and collateral

benefits, once established, will not improve performance,
unless, taken away or significantly reduced.
If increased performance is the objective of
management, implementation of an incentive program is called
for.

However, the effectiveness of incentive programs rely

on the recognition and application of a number of psychological principles.
following:

These are discussed under the

1) Mechanics of Applied Psychology and 2)

Identification of Effective Incentives.
Mechanics of Applied Psychology.

Successful

implementation of a viable merit-pay program requires that
those school administrators in charge of the distribution of
awards and maintainance of

merit-p~y

programs possess a

functional understanding of reinforcement theory and
practices.

With respect to the issues of

~dministering

rewards, Castetter (1981) expressed the following:
Until there is greater administrative and technical
rationality in the operation of reward systems, the
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greater the likelihood that the single-salary
schedule . . . will continue to shape compensation
for a majority of professional people.
(p. 36)
Functionally, merit-pay programs follow the
reinforcement paradigm set forth by Skinner (1954).

Within

the operant conditioning scheme, each time a significant
increase in performance is noted a reinforcement is given.
Th~

significant feature of operant conditioning as the

procedure relates to merit pay is, financial incentives
follow observed performance.
are:

Critical to this procedure

a) the reinforcement must be associated with the

performance specified by the merit-pay program (Lawler
1971); b) the reinforcement must follow the desired
performance within a reasonable time span (Newman and Logan,
1976); and c) the employee must be aware of and understand
the organization's performance expectations (Haworth, 1972;
Dinsmore, 1972; and Dunn and Rachel, 1974).
Within the scope of the operant conditioning
principles, schedules of reinforcement are to be given full
consideration.

First, continuous reinforcement is an

effective method for achieving temporary rapid gains in
performance.

Negatively, the performance curve reaches a

plateau and eventually declines following successive
continuous reinforcements.

Ratio and interval scheduling

provides a viable alternative for maintaining high levels
of performance, where the interval scheduling stabalizes
performance more effectively in between reinforcements
(Ferster and Skinner, 1957).

Difficulties arise as a result
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of management's manipulation of ratio and interval
schedules.

Should the employee perceive ratios of

reinforcement that are not appropriate to the performance
differences among employees, dissension may result.

If, in

the event of interval scheduling, the intervals become
spaced too far apart, extinction occurs, thereby adversely
affecting performance by reducing the performance level or
causing the

performan~e

to cease entirely.

Identification of Effective Incentives.

Correct

decisions made about the type of incentives to be employed
to motivate increased performance is critical to any
incentive plan.

The ability of the plan to maximize

performance is contingent on the selection of those
incentives appropriate to the personnel in the organization.
An absence of careful analysis and correct selection of
incentives, at this point, may fail to cause improvement in
performance or result in the deterioration of existing
performance levels.
Two basic incentive types may be utilized to
motivate increased performance.

Van Zwoll (1964) classified

these incentives as "financial" and "nonfinancial"
incentives.

Under the heading of financial incentives are

those direct monetary rewards linked to excellence in
performance.

The acquisition of material goods according to

Drucker (1974) is the primary basis that cause monetary
rewards to be extremely powerful and pervasive.

He added,

due to the increasing costs of material goods, monetary
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rewards continue to be the primary mechanism influencing
employee performance.

Lawler (1971) stressed, although pay

can be a powerful motivator of
that of a secondary reinforcer.

perform~nce,

pay's role is

Under these circumstances

he added, if the needs with which pay is associated are
satisfied by other means, pay has little or no effect on
performance.
Sibson (1981) and Van Zwoll (1974) also recognize
the importance of financial incentives as a primary
motivational force.

However, these writers, as well as

Dunn and Rachel (1971), recognize that financial incentives
are not always the key incentives of choice.

Sibson (1981)

pointed out that for all workers, at least, at one time in
their working careers, financial gain is the principal
motivator.

Dunn and Rachel (1971) also pointed out that

there will be variances in the employee's need for
additional financial resources, at which time monetary
gains will be most effective and have the highest incentive
value.

Implied is as one set of the individual's needs are

satisfied, incentives will need to be changed if further
performance increases are to be realized.
The selection of the appropriate incentive is a
complex issue within the organization.

First, a group of

employees will be readily motivated by the choice to gain
additional financial benefits, primarily because the
financial benefits satisfy their basic needs (Van Zwoll,
1964).

Second, a group of employees will look for
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nonfinancial incentives for the satisfaction of higherorder needs (Lawler, 1971).

Third, the remaining members

of the organization may look at financial gain as a measure
of their success, and in a sense use these monetary gains
as a "score card" measuring their achievements within the
organization (Dunn and Rachel, 1971).
Financial and nonfinancial incentives play a
critical role depending on the following three factors.
First, should the employee wish to satisfy higher-order
needs as defined by Maslow's hierarchy of needs,
nonfinancial incentives may be the incentive of choice in
some cases.

Second, those employees having a high need

for achievement may actually be affronted by financial
inducements, unless, they are being used by the individual
to measure achievement.

In contrast, however, those

employees with low achievement needs are positively
influenced by financial incentives (Dunn and Rachel, 1971).
Third, the need for affiliation is a powerful factor with
respect to employee performance.

This simply implies that

those with which the employee works must satisfy the need
for interpersonal relationships.
Nine basic factors have been identified by Sibson
that provide a basis for evaluating those preconditions
necessary for the implementation of effective merit-pay
programs.
1.
2.
3.

They are:
Fair pay.
Reasonable benefits.
Job security.
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Fair treatment on the job.
Opportunity to get ahead.
Proper handling of questions and grievances.
Opportunity to do a job well.
Safe working conditions.
A good employer.
(Sibson, 1981, p. 167)

Each of the above factors should exist in order to
assure that the financial incentives will induce the
employees to improve their performance.

The absence of one

or more of these factors, except fair pay and reasonable
benefits such as medical plans, should alert management that
a careful examination of nonfinancial incentives is required
prior to merit pay implementation.

Collectively, these

factors promote satisfaction with the organization.
However, factor 1 is critical because according to Haworth
(1972), in order to motivate the employee to take the risk
relative to incentive increments, fluctuations relative to
outputs must not jeopardize the

individu~l's

livelihood.

In retrospect, financial incentives may play an
important role in the motivation of teachers to improve
their performance.

The importance of money, however, is

governed by employee needs and the ability of money to
satisfy these needs.

Without careful analysis of these

variables prior to merit pay implementation, the merit-pay
program's effectiveness is questionable.
Alternative Financial Strategies
Related to the Improvement of
Functionally Incompetent Teachers
Incompetent employees represent a concern that
organizations must contend with.

Unfortunately, the
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practices employed, other than dismissal or retraining, are
costly in terms of the financial resources expended and the
effects incompetent employees have on competent employees'
performance.

Anthony (1981) pointed out that the

incompetent employees are great consumers of time for the
following reasons:

a) they make mistakes that others must

correct; b) they work slowly and miss deadlines, which holds
up other people; c) they can not solve problems themselves;
and d) they manage the manager's time if allowed to.

In

Gffect, Anthony described the incompetent employee as one
who simply can not get the job done right on time.

They

lack the skills, interests, aptitudes, ability, or motivation in some combination to properly perform the job.
Given the NEA's position that the quality of
teaching personnel in the schools is declining (NEA Memo,
1983) and the emphasis advocates of reform on merit pay as
a way to keep good teachers from leaving and to attract
more able teachers (Education USA, 1984), one might be
inclined to conclude that incompetence is a serious issue to
be dealt with by the educational community.
Merit pay is conceptualized as a method to be used
for increasing performance excellence while, at the same
time, not rewarding poor performance (Anthony, 1981).
However, merit-pay programming assumes that the capacity to
perform exists but that the performance is not demonstrated.
With respect to this point, Lawler (1971) pointed out that
employees perform at 50-60 percent of their full capacity.
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Thus the rationale for performance related incentive
payments.
According to Education USA (1984) the National
Commission on Excellence in Education emphasized, " . . .
superior teachers can be rewarded, average ones encouraged,
and poor ones either improved or terminated"

(p. 38).

Brown (1982) supplemented this position by suggesting that
the "deadwood who do not contribute significantly would be
weeded out" (p. 32).

Unfortunately, as Anthony (1981) has

pointed out, incompetence is not an absolute, but varies in
degree relative to the following
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

factors~

These are:

Insufficient training to perform the job.
Poor job placement. The person is in the
wrong job.
A lack of direction from above.
A lack of aptitude and/or ability to do the job
regardless of the amount or type of training
provided.
A lack of interest in the job.
A lack of feedback on performance. The person
does not know whether the job is being
performed properly or not and repeats the
same mistakes.
Inadequate physical resources--tools, space,
equipment, energy, and so on.
Incompetent subordinates.
A lack of adequate support staff for planning.
An incompetent superior.
A poorly defined job and associated job
standards.
A lack of clear agreement between superior and
subordinate job expectations.
(p. 15)

In addition to these factors, consideration should
be given to:

a) are the teacher's efficacy expectations

consonant to good performance (Bandura, 1977); b) are
organizational expectations consistent with production
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related performance expectations (Drucker, 1974)
management strive to achieve organizational

~

c) does

productiveness~

and d) are employees conditioned by work (Kempener, 1982).
Essentially, the identification of incompetency requires
that the determination of incompetency be made in view of
organizational activities and processes as well as the
teacher's weaknesses leading to incompetence.
Each of the above require strategies other than
merit-pay programming.

These strategies fall within the

scope of learning-based incentive plans.

In order for

noticeable changes in employee performance to occur, the
teacher must acquire the appropriate knowledge and/or skills
required to initiate performance improvements, or the
organization must clarify its performance expectations
relative to the outcomes desired.

Without substantive

behavior changes in these areas, merit pay will do little to
motivate increased performance.
Currently, two alternatives to merit-pay programming
have either been proposed or implemented in the schools.
Although the focus of these plans is not on the improvement
of incompetent teacher performance, the mechanics of these
plans provide a basis by which prescriptive strategies can
be developed for the correction of teacher incompetency.
They are:

1) Master Teacher/Career Ladder Plans, and 2)

Mentor Teacher Plans.
Master Teacher/Career Ladder Plans.

Master

teacher/career ladder plans are extensions and modifications
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of existing salary structures.

To a large extent these

plans follow Merit System plans which are based on classification where salary advancements are principally
associated with experience, education, and skill growth.
The assumption underlying these plans are that both
experience and the acquisition of knowledge and/or skill
growth qualifies the teacher for advancement to a
succeeding higher level in the classification system.

In

summarizing these plans, Uzell (1983) noted two additional
criteria for advancement--attendance and superior performance evaluation.

The two plans currently cited as examples

of these strategies are the Florida Plan (Uzell, 1983) and
the Master Teacher Plan advocated by Alexander (1983).
Alexander stressed that the plan he endorses would
make it easier to remove the really incompetent teachers
because a record of their performance will be maintained.
"However, Anthony (1981) pointed out that, frequently, incompetence is not the fault of the employee, and when
incompetence is attributable to the individual, incompetent
performance may be correctable.

In effect, he added, the

managers have the primary responsibility to manage
incompetence even when the subordinate is somewhat
responsible (p. 17).

Drucker (1974) has further suggested

that the organization has a moral obligation to deal
effectively with incompetence.

Principally, Drucker

contended that the stability and productiveness of the
organization depended on the proper management of
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incompetence.
Two key factors found in the master teacher plans
play an important role with respect to the improvement of
incompetent teachers performance.

First, the performance

evaluation should assess the teacher in these areas:

a)

inputs (Masse, 1983); Belcher, 1974)--what the teacher
brings into the learning situation; b) processes and
operational settings (Masse, 1983)--what methods and
conditions prevail to promote learning; and c) outputs
(Masse, 1983; Belcher, 1974)--how the students behavior
has been changed as a result of the teacher's efforts.
Second, if the outputs do not meet the organization's
expectations, what knowledge and skills are required to
satisfy these expectations.
In order for the plan to have an effect on improved
teacher performance, the expectations evaluations should be
made in conjunction with the twelve causes of incompetence,
· which includes management incompetence and the consideration
of incompetent colleagues.

In essence, incompetence, is to

be determined relative to the individual, his colleagues,
and the supervision received.
Mentor Teacher Plans.

Mentor teacher plans focus on

the selection of teachers whose primary responsibility is to
supervise new teachers or teachers who have less
experience or effective teaching skills.

Functionally, the

mentor teacher serves as a model by which the organization's
expectations are transmitted.

Mentor teacher plans, as
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modeling procedures, can be examined in context with
research conducted by Bandura.
Prior to the implementation of a modeling strategy
a number of conditions must be met before notable changes in
behavior can occur.

Bower and Hilgard {1981} reviewed four

processes identified by Bandura that have an effect on the
behavior of the individual through the model.

These are:

a) the model stimulus must be attended by the individual;
b) the subject must be able to code the stimulus event
symbolically; c) the subject must be able to reproduce the
events; and d) reinforcement related to that obtained by the
model must be apparent to the individual.

This implies that

the subject will be rewarded similarily to the model, or the
expectation that similar reinforcements will be forth
coming.
In effect, the preceding processes establish the
environment in which modeling is to take place and
identifies those capacities that the individual must
possess before behavior changes through modeling are to
occur.

Relevant to these processes are factors that have

been identified by Bower and Hilgard (1981) as they relate
to Bandura's research.

They are:

High status models are more imitated.
Imitation induced in the subject decreases as
the model is made more dissimilar to a real
person.
The more complex the skills, the poorer the
the degree of imitation after one observation
trial.
Rewarded behavior of the models is more likely
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5.

to be imitated.
Instruction given to the [individual] before
he observes the model provides high or low
motivation to learn the model'~ behavior.
(Bower and Hilgard, 1981, p. 463)

Tolman (1949) focused primarily on the organism's
expectancy that a given action will lead to a given
consequence.

That is, to the extent that an outcome

contingent on an action is desired and expected, that
action will be selected and activated.

Bandura (1977) has

further suggested that the organism has the conviction that
it can execute the behavior required to produce outcomes.
Essentially, the preconditions described above as they
relate to the environmental setting and characteristics of
the individual, four additional factors come into play with
respect to the individual's responses to the model.

They

are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Past accomplishments of one's own behavior.
Observing others successes and failures with
the behavior.
Verbal persuassion by self and others.
Changes in one's emotional arousal in the
target situation.
(Bower and Hilgard, 1974,
p. 470)

A number of variables come into play with respect to
the effective use of modeling strategies.

Critical to the

model's success in changing behavior are the environmental
setting, the capacities of the individual to learn and
reproduce the model's behavior, the

individual'~

efficacy

expectations, and the reinforcement expected.
Master teacher/career ladder and mentor teacher
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plans provide the school administrators with an opportunity
to deal effectively with incompetence within the school
system.

First, performance weaknesses are identified and

assignment to the most effective plan can be selected.
Second, legal and moral obligations to employees can be
.excercised.

Third, the responsibility to improve perfor-

mance becomes the teacher's responsibility, being more
desirable than dismissal.

More important, however, would be

the improved relations resulting from taking steps that
would improve a teacher's likelihood of receiving future
merit-pay increments.
School Administrative Responsibilities
Related to Merit Pay Implementation
Prior to the implementation of merit-pay programming, administrative personnel charged with the maintainence
of the program should have clearly in mind:

a) how the

participants--parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board members--perceive the benefits they
are to receive from the program's implementation; b) the
potency of financial ·incentives to motivate performance
increases; c) which incentive strategy will promote the
greatest organizational productiveness; d) clear
definitions of evaluation procedures appropriate to the
incentive plan selected; and e) the fundamental purposes of
salaries, collateral benefits, and incentive payments.

To

a large extent, the confidence, cooperation, and reduction
of dissension resulting from merit-pay programming can be
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achieved once these factors have been given careful
consideration.
Once a determination has been made establishing that
the preconditions satisfy the requirements necessary for
successful installation of merit-pay programming, management
will need to evaluate a number of administrative practices
that play an important role in the
tion of merit-pay programming.

succes~ful

implementa-

The critical focus in this

assessment relates to the level of trust and cooperativeness
that can be instilled in the employee.
Lawler (1971), Belcher (1974), and Brunker (1982)
emphasized the importance of fitting the organization's pay
system with the organization's human relations climate and
management style.

In relation to the organizational

climate, Belcher (1974) and Brunker (1982) as well as
Lawler have pointed out that in order to maintain an
effective incentive pay plan, some form of participative
management practice is desirable to effectively tie pay to
performance.

This position has been stressed by Lawler

despite the fact that the authoritarian management style has
given emphasis to the use of pay to motivate performance.
Sibson (1981) further suggested that the merit-pay plan not
be used as a substitute for sound management practices.
This implies that merit-pay programs be highly visible to
employees and to achieve this visibility, management is
required to utilize management practices that involve
employees in the merit-pay program's development.
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Participative management plays an important role
with regards to establishing the tie between pay and
performance in several ways.

First, participative manage-

ment provides an openness that allows employees to express
their needs and what is to be expected from the program.
Second, issues relating to pay secrecy are minimized since
the worker plays an important role in the determination of
merit-pay rates and standards determination.

Third,

participative evaluations reduce the tendency to award
merit-pay increments for reasons other than performance.
Fourth, the employees achieve a sense of purpose in the
organization since the employees perceive themselves as
causal agents in the determination and achievement of the
organization's objectives.
Within the scope of participative management a
number of factors are to be considered.

Lawler (1971)

suggested that pay be made public and that participative
appraisals be carried out.

With respect to pay secrecy,

Drucker (1974) commented that workers will make pay
comparisons regardless of management's attempt to keep pay
strategies secret.

He added, if the discrepancies are

judged as inequitable, employees will express their
dissatisfaction.

Although pay secrecy, as the policy

applies to education, is not currently a serious problem
since pay scales and benefits costs are known by employees,
should the school district decide to implement merit-pay
programming, the temptation not to make awards public
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becomes a possibility.

There are two principal reasons

underlying the failure of an organization not to make
merit-pay increments public.

First, adequate funds may not

be available to support merit-pay programs that would
distribute merit-pay increments to all deserving teachers
and thereby necessitate the establishment of some form of
quota system.

Caution must be taken under these circum-

stances lest the employees attack the merit-pay program as
being political and laden with favoritism.

Should the

merit-pay program be criticized on these grounds, justifiable or not, the link between pay and performance will be
broken, rendering the merit-pay program ineffective.
Second, management may wish to use merit-pay increments
as a mechanism by which coercive pressure is applied to
keep their employees in line or to maintain their position
of authority in the organization.

With regards to this

point English and Marchione (1983) have contended that many
managers still believe that the road to productivity is to
stand over the worker with a club.

In effect, merit pay

serves as that club when used coercively.
Brunker (1982) has suggested that there are two ways
of matching organizations and pay systems.

Management can:

a) fit the plan to the organization; or b) change the
organization to fit the plan.

In either case. the plan

selected provides an opportunity to initiate participative
management.

Thus, Brunker added, this encourages widespread

participation in job evaluation and provides opportunities
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for participative performance appraisal (Lawler, 1971).
Within the participative management structure, the following
conditions outlined by Belcher with regards to incentive
plans can be met.
1.
2.
3.

These are:

employees must [will] believe that good
performance will lead to more pay.
employees must [will] believe that good
performance will not lead to negative
consequences.
employees must [will] believe that their
efforts lead to improved performance.
(p. 347)

Belcher (1974) has also emphasized that as employees
receive more information on decisions, they are more likely
to trust management and.believe that performance--reward
relationships exist even if evidence is not unequivocal.
In contrast, Belcher concluded:
Unless employees in such organizations [authoritarian] can actually see pay-performance
relationships, they are unlikely to believe they
exist.
(p. 452)
In conjunction with Belcher's position, Lawler (1971) added,
the difficulty encountered by traditional management schemes
is that these organizations, in the absence of employee
trust, must install more "objectively" based plans and
establish hard criteria for measuring performance in order
to assure that pay will act as an incentive.
McGarrah (1983) argued that work life has declined
because fewer Americans are participating in the planning
and control of changes in the work process.
contended:

He further

a) workers are rarely consulted; b) unions have

49

resisted efforts to enlist worker participation in planning
job improvements; and c) managers perceive worker participation as a threat to management prerogatives.

In place of

participative management, a common reaction is to attack
productivity with increased pressures and threats on their
employees, by passing the real causes for productivitydeclines (English and Marchione, 1983).

These writers

added, productivity is not often thought of as a managerial
output.

Rather, the blame is shifted to anything or anyone

but management itself.

They concluded management's only

acknowledgement of their responsibility to productivity
management is when the organization's goals and objectives
are met.

Despite the excuses given by management for the

organization's failure to be productive, Shetty (1982)
emphasized that it is the manager--not government nor their
resources (including employees) that make an organization
productive.

Ultimately, he added, productivity is the

responsibility of the manager, and according to English and
Marchione (1983) is to be achieved by management manipulation of those variables that will unlock the latent
abilities of the employee based on mutual respect and
interdependence of interests.

Kent and Otte (1982) have

made an important point regarding the necessity of involving
employees in the decision-making process involving the
organization.

First, they contend that much to the chagrin

of management, many people are finding more self actualization off the job than on the job.

Second, in order to
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gain employee loyalty to the organization and dedication
to high production, organizations must meet various and
frequently changing needs.

Consequently, Kent and Otte

(1982) concluded, by rewarding employees with the things
they value, management will gain productivity and commitment to the organization.
Kippleman and Reinharth (1982) pointed out that
organizations frequently claim to employ merit-reward
systems.

But as these writers and Sibson (1981) and

Anthony (1981) have added, merit-pay increases are oftentimes granted for something other than improved performance.
Freedman, Montaire, and Keller (1982) stressed that if the
compensation system rewards only for loyalty and passive
acceptance of existing procedures, the likelihood of
increased performance is not promoted.

Weiner (1982)

added, as a consequence of rewarding for attributes other
than performance, some organizations may have concluded
that their supervisors are unable or unwilling to implement
a true merit system.
Managerial commitment to their merit-pay system is
critical to the program's success.

Without a clear

~nder

standing of the processes related to the distribution of
merit-pay increments and the determination of "merit," the
merit-pay program's effectiveness becomes questionable.
Consequently, the success of an incentive system (merit pay)
depends on the following:
1.

Management must be committed to spend the time

51
and effort necessary to maintain an incentive
plan efficiently.
All incentive programs require predetermined
standards whose degree of accuracy determines
the plan's success in qearing pay directly to
production.
Under an incentive plan workers can be motivated
either to increase output or reduce standards.
The system of setting standards is, therefore
critical.
(Sibson, 1981, p. 165)

2.

3.

Incentive plans require constant maintenance because of
variations that occur as a result of doing business, and as
a result of human variation.

With regards to this point,

Belcher (1974) added, more incentive plans fail due to
inadequate maintenance than for any other cause.
Complex merit-pay plans are counter-productive and
trequently defeat their intended purpose--to improve
performance.

Belcher (1974), Newman and Logan (1974), and

Lawler (1971) stressed the importance of keeping merit-pay
programs simple and understandable.

With respect to this

point, Lawler (1974) emphasized, "the actual policies and
procedures are often so complex that they mystify and
obfuscate"

(p. 84).

Belcher (1974) stressed that simpli-

city and avoidance of complicated formulas is necessary to
maintain employee trust through employee understanding of
how the plan works and affects their pay.
Establishing a participative management program
serves to:

a) encourage inputs from employees with regards

to the standards to be established; b) the rates to be
utilized; and c) determining eligibility for merit
increments.

Belcher has commented on these issues as
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follows.

First, he contended that employees be encouraged

to use grievance procedures when there is a question about
any part of the operation of the incentive plan.

Second,

standards must be accepted by employees and guaranteed
against any change except on agreed-on changes.

Third, a

base rate should be established for each job on incentive
and this rate should be guaranteed regardless of the
production of the workers.

In addition, the plan is not a

scheme to be used to avoid justifiable increases in base
rate.
Although not specifically discussed by those writers
reviewed as a problem with merit-pay programs, the question
of quotas is brought up by teachers within education.
Success of the

merit~pay

program depends on the eligibility

of the organization's members to receive merit-pay
increments.

Given the premise that merit-pay plans are

installed to reward performance and not reward incompetence,
the cut-off point is to be determined relative to the
employee's performance or lack of performance.

In addition,

another consideration that affects the decision to establish
quotas is the degree of participation the employee has with
regards to the design of the plan.

If trust in the manage-

ment procedures is a key factor in the acceptance of meritpay programming, then management must assure that the plan
does not make incentive payments without corresponding
increases in performance (Belcher, 1974).

On the other

hand, management, in order to assure cooperation from the
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employees,

mu~t

provide merit-pay benefits restricted only

by the failure to perform to standard.

Belcher (1974)

pointed out that with reasonable effort workers should be
able to attain some incentive earnings.

Consequently, the

establishment of quotas, without regards to the performance
standards established in a participative management setting,
would undermine the intent of merit-pay programming.
Summary
Five dimensions were identified and the issues
relevant to each dimension were discussed in this chapter.
Those factors leading to the initial acceptance or rejection
of the merit-pay concept were presented as well as the
psychological determinants influencing improved teacher
performance, evaluation considerations, alternative
strategies to be used for the improvement of incompetent
teacher performance, and the administrative responsibilities
related to successful·merit pay implementation.
Chapter 3 describes the procedures used to identify
the differences among parents, teachers, principals,
superintendents, and school board members

rega~ding

relevant to successful merit pay implementation.

issues

Chapter 3
Method of the Study
Merit pay effectiveness is likely to be governed by
the degree of congruence between the perceptions held by
parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and school
board members with regards to what would occur in the school
districts relative to issues important to merit pay implementation.

In order to identify and evaluate the perceptual

differences that may exist among the school district
constituents, the procedures of the study are discussed
under the following headings.

They are 1) Sample; 2)

Research Methodology; 3) Instrument; and 4) Data Analysis.
Sample
The participants for the study were .parents,
teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board
members drawn from California school districts residing in
16 of 18 regions designated by the Association of California
School Administrators (ASCA Members Handbook, 1983-1984).
The criteria for selecting school districts was that each
region had elementary, high school, and unified school
districts within regional boYndaries, and the administrators of the school districts selected were Superintendents.
Two regions were omitted from the study because they did not
meet the elementary, high school, and unified school
54
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district requirements.

Region 6 did not have high school

districts and region 16 made up the Los Angles Unified
School District.

See Appendix III.

Research Methodology
Ninety-six California school districts were
initially drawn from 16 of 18 regional lists provided by the
Association of California School Administrators.

Stratified

sampling procedures (Ferguson, 1981) and tables of random
numbers (Edwards, 1960) were used to select the school
districts according to school district type--elementary,
high school, and unified school

dist~icts.

Within each school district a parent, teacher,
principal, superintendent, and school board member was
selected to participate in the study.

Random numbers were

computer generated for each group--parents, teachers, and
school board member respondents--and assigned to the
participants for the purpose of establishing a selection
criteria to be used by the Superintendents.

For ease of

distribution, an option was given allowing the teacher to
be selected from the Principal's school site.

The parent,

regardless of the option excercised, was selected from the
student list of the participating teacher.

The principals

were selected from school district directories listed in the
1984 California Public School Directory prior to the
distribution of the survey instrument.

Each principal, in

school districts having more than one principal, was either
randomly selected by random number from those districts
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having more than five principals; or by numerical sequence
for those school districts having five or fewer principals.
The selection of the superintendents for each school
district corresponded with the selection of school districts
as described above.
A query letter was mailed to the superintendents of
each school district selected for the study.

The letter

contained a brief introduction to the study, the sample
required, and a request for their participation in the
study.

See Appendix I.

A self-addressed, postage-paid

response card was included with the query letter.

Pro-

visions were made for the superintendents to indicate on
the response card their willingness to participate in the
study and make comments.

See Appendix I.

Upon receipt of the
folldwing occured:

~esponse

card one of the

1) When a response was received

indicating that the superintendent did not wish to participate in the study, a substitute school district was selected
using the selection procedures outline above.

2) Whenever

the superintendents expressed a willingness to participate
in the study, a packet was immediately mailed.
Each packet distributed to the superintendents
contained:

a) a letter identifying the study; b) the

respondents to be selected; c)

selection and distribution

procedures; d) provisions for recording the respondents
should a follow-up for nonresponse be required; and d) a
reaffirmation that.the results of the study would be
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provided upon completion of the data analysis.
I.

See Appendix

Accompanying each survey instrument was a letter

describing the study, its importance, a request for prompt
return of the completed instrument, and an assurance of
confidentiality, and a self-addressed, postage-paid
envelope.

See Appendix I.

Following an interval of three weeks from the date
the packet was mailed follow-ups were made.

An initial

telephone call was made to the superintendents of school
districts from which no responses were received.

When a

telephone contact was not able to be made, a letter was
mailed expressing the importance of their participation and
the urgency of the district's response.

See Appendix .I.

In the event one or more respondents did not return
a survey instrument, a second packet was sent to the school
district.

This packet contained a letter identifying those

respondents who had not returned a questionnaire as well as
those who did respond.

A second questionnaire was provided

in case the original survey was misplaced.

Instructions

were provided for the selection of an alternate respondent
should the first respondent not wish to participate.

See

Appendix I.
Instrument
In the absence of an instrument to meet the
objectives of the study a survey instrument was constructed.
The survey instrument consisted of 49 items (statements)
written to elicit the repondents' attitudes with regards to
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what would occur in the school districts relative to issues
important to merit pay implementation.

Each item

represented a question directly addressed in the review of
the literature or related to an issue discussed.
were categorized according to five dimensions.
dimensions included:

1)

The items
The

Motivational Factors Influencing

Decisions to Implement Merit-Pay Programs in the
2)

s~hools;

Psychological Determinants Influencing Improved Teacher

Performance; 3) Evaluation Criteria to be Employed for the
Measurement of Teacher Performance Relating to Merit-pay
Awards; 4) Alternative Financial Strategies Related to the
Improvement of Functionally Incompetent Teachers; and 5)
School Administrative Responsibilities Related to Merit Pay
Implementation.

Four additional questions were included on

the survey instrument.

Que~tion

respondents defined merit pay.

1 determined how
Question 2 determined how

the respondents perceived the effects merit pay implementation would have on interpersonal relations in the schools.
Questions 3 and 4 referred to the respondents' sex and age.
See Appendix II.
Likert Scale procedures were used to evaluate the
responses made by the respondents.

In lieu of the

conventional Likert Scale responses, the range of responses
were numerical in value, i.e., 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, -3, where
the positive signed values represent "agreement", negative
signed values represent "disagreement", and 0 (zero) is
"not sure."

Thirty items required a positive response
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(agree) in order to be a positively valenced attribute
favorable to merit-pay programming.

These items were:

I-2,

I-4, I-5, I-6, II-2, II-3, II-5, II-6, II-7, II-8, II-9,
III-1, III-3, III-4, III-5, III-8, III-9, III-10, III-11,
III-12, IV-5, IV-6, IV-7, IV-8, V-1, V-2, V-4, V-5, V-6, and
V-7.

The remaining 19 items required a negative response

(disagree) in order to be a positively valenced attribute
favorable to merit-pay programming.
were weighted as follows:

Each of the responses

Positively valenced responses

(agree) were weighted 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 relative to
3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, and -3 responses.

Positively valenced

responses (disagree) were weighted 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
relative to the 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, and -3 responses.
Twenty respondents, 10 parents and 10 teachers,
participated in the pretesting of the survey instrument.
The survey instrument was checked for clarity of instructions, clarity of statements, instrument format and time
required to complete the survey.

The respondents responded

to the survey instrument under the same conditions as
established for the formal study.

In addition, the

respondents identified those items that were not clearly
written and evaluated the instrument's format.

Items were

rewritten and resubmitted to the respondents for reevaluation if fifty percent or more of the respondents were
uncertain about an item's meaning.

An assessment of the

item response variation was made to determine if items were
to be rewritten or excluded.

In addition to the preliminary
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administration of the survey instrument, three superintendents, three principals, and two managers from the private
sector evaluated the survey instrument in terms of content
and relevance to merit pay prior to the final revision of
the instrument.
Two reliability coefficients were obtained.
are:

They

1) Coefficients of Stability and 2) Coefficients of

~nternal

Consistency.

Kuder Richardson's KR
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was used to

determine the internal consistency of items for each
dimension by group.

For the purposes of obtaining the

coefficients of internal consistency, the responses were
treated as dichotomous data.
Coefficients of Stability.

Two groups were

selected for the determination of stability coefficients.
The stability coefficients for parents by dimension are:
a) Dimension I, .70; b) Dimension II, .67; c) Dimension III,
.52; d) Dimension IV, .01; and e) Dimension V, .54.
coefficients of stability for teachers are:

The

a) Dimension I,

.65; b) Dimension II, .58; c) Dimension III, .79; d)
Dimension IV, .64; and e) Dimension V, .95.
Coefficients of Internal Consistency.
coefficients obtained for parents are:

The

a) Dimension I, .81;

Dimension II, .29; c) Dimension III, .51; d) Dimension IV,
-.15; and e) Dimension V, .73.
cients obtained are:

For teachers the coeffi-

a) Dimension I, .69; b) Dimension II,

.03; c) Dimension III, .51; d) Dimension IV, .14; and e)
Dimension V, .81.

Coefficients for principals are:
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a) Dimension I, .90; b) Dimension II, .32; c) Dimension III,
.32; d) Dimension IV, .35; and e) Dimension V, .48.
superintendents the coefficients obtained are:

For

a) Dimension

I, .66; b) Dimension II, -.38; c) Dimension III, .02; d)
Dimension IV, .07; and e) Dimension V, .72.

The coeffi-

cients obtained for school board members are:

a) Dimension

I, .86; b) Dimension II, -.14; c) Dimension III, .28; d)
Dimension IV, .22; and e) Dimension

v,

.84.

Data Analysis
Analyses of variance were conducted using the
computational procedures described by Winer (1962).

The

purpose of these analyses were to determine if differences
existed between:
within groups.

a) groups by dimension and b) dimensions
In addition to the analyses of variance,

Fisher's Least Significant Differences procedures were used
to determine which group means or dimension means differed
when the analysis of variance rejected the null hypotheses.
Five single factor (1 X 5) analyses of variance were
carried out to determine if differences existed among the
respondent classifications for each dimension.

The

hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 1 :
1

There are no differences among

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would
occur in the schools relative to the motivational factors
influencing decisions to implement merit-pay programs in
the schools.
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Hypothesis 1 :
2

There are no differences among

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would
occur in the school relative to the psycholgical
determinants influencing improved teacher performance.
Hypothesis 1 :
3

There are no differences among

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would
occur in the schools relative to the evaluation criteria to
be employed for the measurement of teacher performance
related to merit-pay awards.
Hypothesis 1 :
4

There are no differences among

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would
occur in the schools relative to the alternative financial
strategies related to the improvement of functionally
incompetent teachers.
Hypothesis 1 :
5

There are no differences among

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would
occur in the schools relative to the school administrative
responsibilities related to merit pay implementation.
Five single factor (1 X 5), repeated measures,
analyses of variance were carried out to determine if
differences existed among the dimension responses within
each respondent classification.

The dimensions are:

a)

motivational factors influencing decisions to implement
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merit-pay programs in the schools; b) psychological determinants influencing improved teacher performance; c)
evaluation criteria to be employed for the measurement of
teacher performance relating to merit-pay

awards~

d)

alternative financial strategies related to the improvement
of functionally incompetent teachers; and e) school administrative responsibilities related to merit pay
implementation.

The hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 2 :
1

there are no differences among the

dimensions listed above with regards to the parents'
perceptions about what would occur in the schools relative
to each dimension.
Hypothesis 2 :
2

There are no differences among the

dimensions listed above with regards to the teachers'
perceptions about what would occur in the schools relative
to each dimension.
Hypothesis 2 :
3

There are no differences among the

dimensions listed above with regards to the principals'
perceptions about what would occur in the schools relative
to each dimension.
Hypothesis 2 :
4

There are no differences among the

dimensions listed above with regards to the superintendents' perceptions about what would occur in the schools
relative to each dimension.
Hyp_othesis 2 :
5

There are no differences among the

dimensions listed above with regards to the school board
members' perceptions about what would occur in the schools
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relative to each dimension.
Additional analyses were carried out which consisted
of:

a) an analysis of individual items and b) supplementary

data analyses.

The analyses of individual items were

reported in terms of group means and standard deviations,
and proportion of favorable responses by group.
the supplementary analyses were:

Included in

a) group responses rela-

tive to the respondents' definition of merit pay; b) group
responses relative to the respondents' perceptions regarding
the effect merit pay implementation would have on interpersonal relations in the schools; c) group responses
relative to the respondents' sex and age.
Summary
A description of the population, the method of the
study, development of the instrument, procedures of the
study, and the methods for data analysis have been provided
in this chapter.

Chapter 4 presents the results of the

study and interpretation of the results.

Chapter 4
RESULTS OF THE STUDY
Five groups, namely:

parents, teachers, principals,

superintendents, and school board members, were selected for
the determination of differences between groups, with
regards to what would happen in the schools, relative to
issues important to merit pay implementation.

The issues

identified for the study are categorized according to five
dimensions.

The dimensions are:

1) Motivational Factors

Influencing Decisions to Implement Merit-pay Programs in the
Schools; 2) Psychological Determinants Influencing Improved
Teacher Performance; 3) Evaluation Criteria to be Employed
for the Measurement of Teacher Performance; 4) Alternative
Financial Strategies Related to the Improvement of
Functionaily Incompetent Teachers; and 5) School Administrative Responsibilities Related to Merit Pay Implementation.

See Table 12, page 94 for a description of the items

included in each of the above categories.
The data analysis is divided into four parts,
namely:

1) Group Differences Within Dimensions; 2)

Dimension Differences Within Groups; 3) Individual Item
Analysis; and 4) Supplementary Analyses.
Group Differences Within Dimensions
In order to obtain maximum effectiveness, the
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merit-pay programs selected by school districts should be
implemented in a school environment where agreement among
the school district's constituents is favorable to merit
pay.

Five dimensions were analyzed in order to determine

if differences existed between groups, and to identify
those groups in which differences occurred.
Five single factor (1 X 5) analyses of variance were
carried out in order to test the hypotheses that there are
no differences between groups within each dimensionsion.

In

addition, Fisher's Least Significant Differences procedures,
for unequal sample sizes, were used to identify differences
between group means within each dimension for those cases
in which the hypotheses were rejected.

The .05 level of

significance was used to test the following hypotheses.
Dimension I.

Motivational Factors Influencing

Decisions to Implement Merit-pay Programs in the Schools.
The purpose for implementing merit-pay programs in the
school is to benefit the members of the school community
by improving the school district's productivity, which, in
turn results in increased financial benefit to the teachers
relative to improved performance.
Hypothesis Hl :
1

there are no differences among

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would
occur in the schools relative to the motivational factors
influencing decisions to implement merit-pay programs in
the schools, is rejected at the .05 level of significance;
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Fobs.= 7.68, . 95 F ( 4 , 151 ) = 2.43.

See Table 1.1, page 67

for the analysis of variance summary.
Differences were found between groups which are
limited to differences between teachers and parents, principals, superintendents, and school board members.

The

differences between group means indicate that teachers'
responses are less favorable to merit pay implementation in
regards to the motivational factors influencing decisions
to implement merit pay in the schools than are the responses
of parents, principals, superintendents, and school board
members.

Teachers fail to accept the hypothesis that merit

pay will improve educational productivity or benefit members
of the school community.

However, parents, principals,

superintendents, and school board members accept the
hypothesis.

See Table 1.4, page 68 for the summary of

differences between groups.

Table 1.2, page 68 provides a

summary of item and dimension means.
Table 1
Dimension I Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance,
Item Means, Proportion of Responses Favorable
to Merit Pay, and Differences Between Means
Table 1.1. Analysis of Variance Summary: Motivational Factors
Influencing Decisions to Implement Merit-pay Programs
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

ss
52.41

-df -

250.92

4
151

303.33

155

-MS
15.10

*.95 F (4, 151) = 2 "43

-F
7.68*
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Table 1.2.

Item Means: Motivational Factors Influencing Decisions to
Implement Merit-pay Programs In the Schools
1
2
3
5
6
8
4
7
T
Parents 5.00 5.48 5.43 5.74 5.00 5.09 3.83 3.56 4.87
2.87 4.07 3.53 3.83· 3.30 3.43 2.67 2.30 3.22
Teachers
Principals 3.91 5.06 5.30 5.27 4.52 4.52 3.94 2.94 4.46
Superintendents 4.23 4.77 5.51 5.33 4.16 4.52 4.70 3.26 4.62
School Board Members
4.03 5.48 5.56 5.00 4.37 4.46 4.48 3.55 4.62

Table 1.3. Proportion of Responses Favorable to Merit Pay: Motivational
Factors Influencing Decisions to Implement Merit Pay in the Schools
6
7
8
1
3
5
T
2
4
Parents
.65 .83 .78 .87 .65 .65 .30 .35 .64
Teachers
.20 .47 .43 .43 .20 .37 .10 .13 .29
Principals
.45 .67 .80 .77 .60 .63 .50 .20 .58
Superintendents
.47 .63 .74 .72 .35 .56 .53 .28 .54
School Board Members
.48 .81 .78 .70 .59 .63 .63 .33 .62

Table 1.4. Differences Between Group Means Using Fisher's Critical~
Method: Motivational Factors Influencing Decsions to
Implement Merit-pay Programs in the Schools
Parents
Parents
Teachers
Principals
Super (ntendents
School Board
Members
*.95 t 151 = 1"65

4.62*
1.17
.75
.16

Dimension II.

Teachers

Principals

3.82*
4.57*
4.61*

.54
1.06

Superintendents

School Board
Members

.59

Psychological Determinants Influencing

Improved Teacher Performance.
Hypothesis Hl : there are no differences between
2
parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would
occur in the schools relative to the pyschological determinants influencing improved teacher performance, is rejected
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at the . 05 level
of significance; F 0 b s.
.
_

95

F ( ,
)
4 151

=

2.43.

=

8. 48,

See Table 2.1, page 69 for the

analysis of variance summary.
Differences.between groups were identified.

The

differences between group means indicate that the principals' responses are more favorable to merit pay regarding
the psychological determinants influencing improved teacher
performance than are parents, teachers, superintendents,
and school board members.

In addition, teachers' responses

are less favorable to merit pay than are the responses of
parents, principals, superintendents, and school board
members.

See Table 2.4, page 69 for the summary of

differences between groups.

Table 2.2, page 69 provides a

summary of item and dimension means.
Table 2
Dimension II Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance,
Item Means, Proportion of Responses Favorable
to Merit Pay, and Differences Between Means
Table 2.1.

Anarysis of Variance Summary: Pyschological Determinants
Influencing Improved Teacher Performance

Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

-ss

-df

-MS

8.43
37.51

4
151

2.10

45.94

155
*

.95

F

(4, 151)

-F
8.48*

= 2.43
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Table 2.2.

Parents
Teachers
Principals
Superintendents
School Board Members

Item Means: Psychological Determinants Influencing
Improved Teacher Performance
2
5
6
7
8
3
4
9
4.48 4.30 3.04 4.30 3.21 3.87 5.61 5.00 4.13
4.60 4.49 3.97 3.81 3.53 3.60 5.90 3.73 3.13
5.06 4.52 2.61 4.48 4.00 4.12 5.36 5.73 5.33
5.13 4.28 2.63 4.53 3.40 4.16 5.67 4.83 5.47
4.65 3.88 2.24 4.42 4.15 4.54 5.54 5.38 4. 73

10
3.87
2.53
4.88
5.16
3.92

T
4.25
3.92
4.62
4.39
4.33

Table 2.3.

Proportion of Responses Favorable to Merit Pay: Psychological
Determinants Influencing Improved Teacher Performance
1
2
5
6
7
8
9
10 T
3
4
Parents
.56 .43 .26 .57 .26 .30 .74 .57 .39 .39 .45
Teachers
.63 .53 .40 .37 .33 .27 .90 .33 .20 .19 .42
Principals
.67 .51 .12 .55 .48 .33 .73 .85 .70 .67 .56
Superintendents
.79 .56 .07 .58 .30 .47 .84 .63 .40 .74 .54
School Board Members
.65 .38 .08 .54 .50 .50 .73 .73 .54 .46 .51

Table 2.4.

Differences Between Group Means Using Fisher's Critical t
Method: Psychological Determinants Influencing
Improved Teacher Performance

Parents
Parents
Teachers
Principals
Superintendents
School Board
Members
* .95 t 151 = 1 .65

Teachers

Principals

Superintendents

School Board
Members

2.38*
2. 72*

.85
.56

Dimension III.

5.55*
3.70*
3.06*

2.25*
2.21*

.24

Evaluation Criteria to be Employed

for the Measurement of Teacher Performance Relating to
Merit-pay Awards.
Hypothesis Hl :
3

there are no differences between

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would
occur in the schools relative to the evaluation criteria
to be employed for the measurement of teacher performance
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relating to merit-pay awards, is not rejected at the .05
level of significance; f.obs.

=

.56, _95 F ( 4 , lSl)

=

2.43.

See Table 3.1 for the analysis of variance summary.
No differences were found between group means.

As

a result, it can not be concluded that the responses
provided by the parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board members reflect different attitudes
with regards to the evaluation criteria to be employed for
the measurement of teacher performance relating to merit-pay
awards.

However, there is variation between the individual

item means which are discussed in the Analysis of Individual
Items section.

See Table 3.2, page 71 for a summary of

item and dimension means.
Table 3
Dimension III Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance,
Item Means, and Proportion of Responses Favorable
to Merit Pay
Table 3.1. Analysis of Variance Summary: Evaluation Criteria to
be Employed for the Measurement of Teacher Performance
Relating to Merit-pay Awards
Source of Variation
Between Groups.
Within Groups
Total

-ss

-df

-MS

-F

.93
62.04

4
i51

.23
.41

.56*

62.97

155
*.95F (4, 151 l = 2 ' 43
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Table 3.2.

Item Means: Evaluation Criteria to be Employed for
the Measurement of Teacher Performance
Relating to Merit-pay Awards
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
5.70 3.00 4.35 5.35 3.83 5.87 4.83 4.34 4.30 4.26 2.70
6.10 3.93 3.87 3.87 4.60 5.73 5.47 3.43 2.83 4.07 3.57
5.82 3.42 4.94 5.18 4.36 5.30 3.94 4.73 2.73 2.70 3.39
5.53 3.47 4.23 4.70 4.60 4.63 3.63 5.02 2.56 3.23 3.58
5.81 3.62 4.50 4.58 3.65 4.88 3.88 4.62 3.27 3.04 3.27

13
5.87
5.40
6.03
5.91
5.88

T
4.53
4.30
4.35
4.36
4.28

Proportion of Responses Favorable to Merit Pay: Evaluation Criteria
to be Employed for the Measurement of Teacher Performance
Relating to Merit-Pay Awards
10
11
12
13
6
9
1
2
3
4
5
7
8
Parents
• 74 .26 .48 .74 .48 .78 .61 .61 .43 .43 .13 .43 .91
Teachers
.83 .43 .47 .37 .67 .77 .70 .33 .17 .40 .33 .27 .87
.85 .32 .62 .65 .59 .68 .47 .62 • 21 .15 .26 .68 .91
Principals
Superintendents
.81 .42 .56 .65 .60 .60 .42 .72 .19 .30 .30 • 79 .91
.81 .42 .58 .62 .46 .69 .50 .73 .23 .23 .19 .65 .85
School Board Members

T
.54
.51
.54
.56
.54

Parents
Teachers
Principals
Superintendents
School Board Members

12
3.91
3.20
4.73
5.35
4.68

Table 3.3.

Dimension IV.

Alternative Financial Strategies

Related to the Improvement of Functionally Incompetent
Teachers.
Hypothesis Hl :
4

there are no differences between

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would
occur in the schools relative to the financial strategies
related to the improvement of functionally incompetent
teachers is not rejected at the .05 level of significance;
fobs.= 1.65, _95 F( 4 , 151 ) = 2.43.

See Table 4.1, page 73

for the analysis of variance summary.
No differences were found between group means.
Therefore, it can not be concluded that the responses
provided by the parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board members have different opinions
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regarding the alternative

fin~ncial

strategies

related to

the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers.

See

Table 4.2, page 73 for a summary of the Dimension IV item
and dimension means.
Table 4
Dimension IV Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance,
Item Means, and Proportion of Responses Favorable
to Merit Pay
Table 4.1.

Analysis of Variance Summary: Alternative Financial
Related to the Improvement of Functionally
Incompetent Teachers

Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

ss

-

-

df

-

MS

-

2.25
51.48

4
151

.56
.34

1.65*

53.65

155
*

.95

F

(4, 151)

F

2.43

Table 4.2. Item Means: Alternative Financial Strategies
Related to the Improvement of Functionally
Incompetent Teachers
8
6
7
2
3
4
5
T
4.96 3.74 4.08 2.70 4.13 5.26 5.61 4.09 4.38
Parents
Teachers
5.20 5.13 4.70 5.03 4.20 5.00 4.63 3.37 4.64
Principals 4.94 4.42 5.30 2.82 4.76 5.40 5.48 3.61 4.58
Superintendents 4.88 4.79 4. 77 2.51 4.12 4.88 4.63 4.07 4.34
School Board Members
5.11 4.04 4.00 2.69 5.19 5.23 5.69 3.35 4.44

Table 4.3.

Proportion of Responses Favorable to Merit Pay:
Financial Strategies Related to the Improvement
of Functionally Incompetent Teachers
5
6
1
2
3
4
7
Parents
.57 .26 .39 .13 .78 • 78 .74
Teachers
.67 .60 .60 .67 .40 .70 .57
Principals
.56 .44 .56 .24 .62 .79 .82
Superintendents
.60 .60 .58 .16 .53 .81 .58
School Board Members
.69 .31 .31 .12 .56 .85 .81

Alternative

8
.43
.30
.32
.37
.19

T
.51
.56
.54
.53
.48
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Dimension V.

School Administrative Responsibilities

Related to Merit Pay Implementation.
Hypothesis Hl :
5

there are no differences between

parents', teachers', principals', superintendents', and
school board members' perceptions with regards to what would
occur in the schools relative to the school administrative
responsibilities related to merit pay implementation, is
not rejected at the .05 level of significance; -F0 b s . = 1.43,
. 95 F ( 4 , 151 )

=

2.43.

See Table 5.1, page 74 for the

analysis of variance summary.
No. differences were found between group means.

As a

result, it can not be concluded that the responses provided
by parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and
school board members reflect differences of opinion
regarding the school administrative responsibilities related
to merit pay implementation.

See Table 5.2, page 75 for a

summary of item and dimension means.
Table 5
Dimension V Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance,
Item Means, and Proportion of Responses Favorable
to Merit Pay
Table 5.1. Analysis of Variance Summary: School Administrative
Responsuibilities Related to Merit Pay Implementation
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

-ss

-df

-MS

-F

4.97
130.79

4
151

1.24
.87

1.43*

135.76

155
*

F
.95 (4, 151)

= 2.43
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Table 5.2.

Parents
Teachers
Principals
Superintendents
School Board Members

Item Means: School Administrative Responsibilities
Related to Merit Pay Implementation
9
4
5
6
7
8
2
3
5.52 5.74 4.52 3.22 5.61 5.91 6.00 5.52 3.89
4.67 5~27 4.83 3.86 5.53 4.90 4.57 4.93 4.80
5.48 6;33 4.91 3.41 5.76 6.12 6.24. 5.29 4.91
5.37 5.70 4.88 3.67 5.35 5.70 6.02 5.51 4.86
5.81 5.92 4.23 4.19 5.26 5. 77 6.31 5.11 4.59

Proportion of Responses Favorable to Merit Pay: School
Administrative Responsibilities Related
to Merit Pay Implementation
8
9
10
4
5
6
7
3
1
2
Parents
.83 .87 .48 .17 .83 .83 .87 .78 .26 .48
Teachers
.57 .73 .57 ;37 .77 .63 .53 .57 .53 .47
Principals
.85 .94 .53 .35 .91 .91 .91 .68 .62 .53
Superintendents
.77 .86 .63 .33 ;74 .86 .91 .84 .60 .42
School Board Members
.92 .92 .42 .50 .85 .85 .92 .62 .46 .46

10
3.95
4;40
4.55
4.41
4.42

T
4.96
4. 76
5.31
5.15
5.13

Table 5.3.

Summary.

F
.64
.57
.72
.64
.69

The contention that there are no differ-

ences between parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board members is not confirmed for those
dimensions relating to:

a) motivational factors influencing

decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the schools;
and b) psychological determinants influencing improved
teacher performance.

For:

a) evaluation criteria to be

employed for the measurement of teacher performance related
.to merit-pay awards; b) alternative financial strategies
related to the improvement of functionally incompetent
teachers; and c) school administrative responsibilities
related to merit pay implementation, the position that there
are no differences between parents, teachers, principals,
superintendents, and school board members is confirmed.
Differences between groups were identified for
Dimension I and Dimension II.

In the majority of the cases
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where differences were noted, teachers were more frequently
paired with other groups.
Teachers responses were not favorable to merit pay
implementation with regards to:

motivational factors

influencing decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the
schools.

In contrast, parents and school board members were

more inclined to respond favorably to the above.
were "not sure" with regards to:

psychological determinants

influencing improved teacher performance.
to respond favorably.
more favorably to:

Teachers

Principals tended

Teachers and principals responded

alternative financial strategies related

to the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers than
did parents, superintendents, and school board members.
With respect to:

school administrative responsibilities

related to merit pay implementation, all groups provided
favorable responses.

However, teachers are not as strong in

their conviction as are parents, principals, superintendents, and school board members.
Overall, there are no strong commitments, favorable
or unfavorable, to merit pay implementation with the
possible exception of:

1) Teachers rejecting the premise

that merit pay would improve school productivity and benefit
members of the school community.

2) Parents and school

board members supporting the premise that school productivity would be increased and school community members will
benefit.

3) Parents, teachers, principals, superintendents,

and school board members supporting the position that school
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administrators would provide administrative support facilitating an effective merit-pay program.
Dimension Differences Within Groups
Five single factor (l X 5) repeated measures
analyses of variance were carried out to test the hypotheses
that there are no differences between dimensions within
groups.

The groups are a) parents, b) teachers, c) princi-

pals, d) superintendents, and e) school board members.
Differences between dimension means were determined using
Fisher's Least Significant Differences procedures for equal
sample sizes.

The .05 level of significance was used to

test the following hypotheses.
Parents.

Hypothesis H2 :
1

there are no differences

between dimensions within the parent group is rejected at
the .05 level of significance; Fobs.= 2.86, _95 F( 4 , 88 )=
2.48.

See Table 6.1, page 78 for the analysis of variance

summary.
Differences between the dimensions within groups
were found.

These differences indicate that parents respond

less favorably to:

a) psychological determinants influ-

encing teacher performance; and b) alternative financial
strategies related to the improvement of functionally
incompetent teachers, than they do to motivational factors
influencing decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the
schools.
for:

In addition, parent responses are less favorable

a) psychological determinants influencing improved

teacher performance; and b) alternative financial strategies
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related to the improvement of functionally incompetent
teachers than they do for school administrative responsibilities related to merit pay implementation.

The strongest

responses favorable to merit pay implementation made by
parents were:

a) motivational factors influencing decisions

to implement merit-pay programs in the schools; and b)
school administrative responsibilities related to merit
pay implementation.

See Table 6.2, page 78 for a summary

of differences between dimensions.
Table 6
Parents Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance,
and Differences Between Dimensions
Table 6.1.

Parents Between Dimensions Analysis of Variance

Source of Variation

·ss-

-df

Between Parents
Within Parents
Dimensions
Residual

20.39
76.62

92

4
88
97.00

2.20
.77

2.86*

114
*

Table 6.2.

-F

22

8.81
67.80

Total

-MS

F
.95 {4, 88)

2.48

Differences Between Dimension Means Withi~ Par!:_nts Groups Using
Fisher's.Critical Difference Method CXC- XRl
Dimension I

Dimension I
Dimension II
Dimension Ill
Dimension IV
*Critical Difference

.62*
.34
.49*
.09
= .44

Dimension II
.28
.13
.71*

Dimension Ill

.15
.43

Dimension IV

.58*

Dimension V
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Teachers.

Hypothesis H2 :
2

there are no differences

between dimensions within the teacher group is rejected at
the .05 level of significance; Fobs.= 13.71, • 95 F( 4 , 116 )
2.46.

=

See Table 7.1, page 80 for analysis of variance

summary •.
Critical differences were found between dimensions
within the teachers group.

The differences between

dimension means indicate that teacher's responses are more
favorable towards:

a) psychological determinants influ-

encing improved teacher performance; b) alternative
financial strategies related to the improvement of
functionally incompetent teachers; c) evaluation criteria to
be employed for the measurement of teacher performance
related to merit-pay awards; and d) school administrative
responsibilities related to merit pay implementation, than
they are to motivational factors influencing decisions to
implement merit pay programs in the schools.

Teachers also

respond more favorably to financial strategies related to
the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers than
to psychological determinants influencing improved teacher
performance.

In addition, teachers are more inclined to

respond favorably to school administrative responsibilities
related to merit pay implementation and less favorably to
either:

a) psychological determinants influencing improved

teacher performance; and b) evaluation criteria to be
employed for the measurement of teacher performance relating
to merit-pay awards.

See Table 7.2 for a summary of
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of differences between dimensions.
Table 7
Teachers Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance,
and Differences Between Dimensions
Table 7.1.

Teachers Between Dimensions Analysis of Variance

-ss

Source of· Variation
Between Teachers
Within Teachers
Dimensions,
Residual

34.93
145.19
46.63
98.56

Total

180.12

-df
29
120
4
128

-F

11.66

13.72*

.as

149
*

Table 7.2.

-MS

F
= 2.46
.95 (4, 116)

Differences Between Dimension Means Within Teachers Group Using
Fisher's Critical Difference Method <XC- XR>
Dimension I

Dimension I
Dimension II
.70*
Dimension Ill
1.08*
Dimension IV
1.42*
Dimension V
1.54*
*Critical Difference= .40

Principals.

Dimension II

.38
.72*
.84*

Dimension Ill

.34
.46*

Hypothesis H2 :
3

Dimension IV

Dimension V

.12

there are no

.

differences between dimensions within the principals group
is rejected at the .05 level of significance; F b
-0

.

95

F ( 4 , 132 )

=

2.44.

s.

=

7.39,

See Table 8.1, page 81 for analysis of

variance summary.
The differences found between dimension means indicates that principals respond more favorably to:

school

administrative responsibilities related to merit pay
implementation than they respond to:

a) motivational
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factors influencing decisions to implement merit-pay
programs in the schools; b) evaluation criteria to be
employed for the measurement of teacher performance relating
to merit-pay awards; and c) alternative financial strategies
related to the improvement of functionally incompetent
teachers.

See Table 8.2, page 81 for a summary of

differences between dimensions.
Table 8
Principals Summary Tables for the Analysis of Variance,
and Differnces Between Dimensions
Table 8.1.

Principals Between Dimensions Analysis of Variance Summary

Source of Variation

-ss

-df

-MS

-F

Between Principals
Within Principals
Dimensions
Residual

17.44
98.27

32
132
4
128

4.61
.62

7.39*

18.43
79.84

Total

115.71

164
* • 95 F <4 , 128 > = 2 • 44

Table 8.2.

Differences Between Dimension Means Within Principals Group Using
Fisher's Critical Difference Method <XC- XR)
Dimension I

Dimension If

Dimension I
.16
Dimension II
• 11
Dimension Ill
Dimension IV
.12
Dimension V
.85*
- *Critical Difference= .33

Superintendents.

.27
.04
.69*

Dimension Ill

.23
.96*

Hypothesis H2 :
4

Dimension IV

Dimension V

.73*

there are no

differences between dimensions within the superintendents
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group is rejected at the .05 level of significance;
Fobs.= 10.74, _95 F( 4 , 168 ) = 2.43.

See Table 9.1, page 83

for the analysis of variance summary.
Differences between dimensions were found within the
superintendents group.

The differences between dimension

means indicate that superintendents are less favorable to:
a) evaluation criteria to be employed for the measurement of
teacher performance relating to merit-pay awards; and b)
alternative financial strategies related to the improvement
of functionally incompetent teachers, than they are to
motivational factors influencing decisions to implement
merit-pay programs in the schools.

In addition, superin-

tendents are more favorable to school administrative
responsibilities related to merit pay implementation than
they are to:

a) motivational factors influencing decisions

to implement merit pay programs in the schools; b)
psychological determinants influencing improved teacher
performance; c) evaluation criteria to be employed for the
measurement of teacher performance relating to merit-pay
awards; and d) alternative financial strategies related to
the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers.

See

Table 9.2, page 83 for a summary of dimension differences.
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Table 9
Superintendents Summary Tables for the Analysis of
Variance, and Differences Between Dimensions
Table 9.1.

Superintendents Between Dimensions Analysis of Variance Summary

-ss

-df

-MS

36.38
99.33

42
172
4
i68

5.06
.47

Source of Variation
Between Superintendents
Within Superintendents
Dimensions
Residual

20.24
79.10

Total

10.74*

214

135.72

*

Table 9.2.

-F

.95

F

(4, 168)

= 2.43

Differences Between Dimension Means Within Superintendents Group
Using Fisher's Critical Difference Method <XC - XRl
Dimension I

Dimension I
Dimension I I
.23
.26*
Dimension I I I
Dimension IV
.28*
Dimension V
.53*
*Critical Difference= .25

Dimension II

Dimension Ill

.03
.05
.76*

School Board Members.

.02
• 79*

Dimension IV

Dimension V

.81*

Hypothesis H2 :
5

there are no

differences between dimensions within the school board
members group is rejected at the .05 level of significance;
E:.obs. = 5.47, . 95 F( 4 , lOO) = 2.46.

See Table 10.1, page 84

for analysis of variance summary.
Differences were found between dimension means for
the school board members group.

The differences between

dimension means indicate that school board members are less
favorable to: a) psychological determinants influencing
improved teacher performance; b) alternative financial
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strategies related to the improvement of incompetent
teachers, than they are to motivational factors influencing
decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the schools.
School board members are more favorable to school adminis\

trative responsibilities related to merit pay implementation
than they are to:

a) motivational factors influencing

decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the schools;
b) psychological determinants influencing improved teacher
performance; c) evaluation criteria to be used to measure
teacher performance relating to merit-pay awards; and d)
alternative financial strategies related to the improvement
of functionally incompetent teachers.
Table 10
School Board Members Summary Tables for the Analysis
Variance, and Differences Between Dimensions
Table 10.1.

School Board Members Between Dimensions Analysis of Variance Summary

Source of Variation
Between School Board Members
Within School Board Members
Dimensions
Residual
Total

-ss

-df

-MS

-F

28.45
75.63

25
104
4
100

3.39
.62

5.47*

13.57
62.06
104.08

129

* .95 F C4,

1OO) = 2. 46
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Table 10.2. Differences Between Dimension Means Within School Board Members
Group Using Fisher's Critical Difference Method CXC - XR>
Dimension I
Dimension I
Dimension II
Dimension Ill
Dimension IV
Dimension V
*Critical Difference

Dimension II

.48*
.53*
.37
.32
= ,37

.05
.11
.80*

Dimension Ill

.16
.85*

Dimension IV

Dimension V

.69*

Table 10.3.

Groups-Dimensions Means Summary
IV
v
I
II
Ill
Parents 4.87 4.25 4.53 4.38 4.96
Teachers 3.22 3.92 4.30 4.64 4.76
Principals 4.46 4.62 4.35 4.58 5.31
Superintendents 4.62 4.39 4.36 4.34 5.15
School Board Members 4.81 4.33 4.28 4.44 5.13

Summary.

A number of differences were found between

dimensions within each group.

However, one pair of dimen-

sion differences are common to all groups.

Parents,

teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board
members respond more favorably to school administrative
responsibilities related to merit pay implementation than
to psychological determinants influencing improved teacher
performance.

In addition, with respect to school adminis-

trative responsibilities related to merit pay implementation
two pairs of dimension differences have been identified in
which differences are found for four of five groups.

First,

teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board
members respond less favorably to evaluation criteria to be
employed for the measurement of teacher performance related
to merit pay; and second, parents, principals,
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superintendents, and school board members respond less
favorably to alternative financial strategies related to the
improvement of functionally incompetent teachers than they
do to school administrative responsibilities related to
merit pay implementation.

See Table 10.3, page 85 for a

summary of group-dimension means.
Individual Item Analysis
Group differences within dimensions and dimension
differences within groups have analyzed and discussed above.
Although differences were found, the differences identified
provide only trends and general relationships between groups
and dimensions.

The following analyses examines group

responses to item means within each dimension in terms of
whether the responses to the items are:

a) favorable to

merit pay implementation; b) unfavorable to merit pay
implementation; or c)

"not sure."

The assignment of the

item means is based on a critical difference that estimates
the items significant departure from the survey response
value, 4, which represents "not sure."

The decision rule

used to determine critical differences takes into account
the sample size and response variation.

Those item means

which exceed 4.0 + Diff, or are less than 4.0 - Diff are
treated as favorable and unfavorable respectively, where
Diff

= _95

t(n) (s/lfi).

All other item means are treated as

"not sure."
Dimension I.

Motivational Factors Influencing

Decisions to Implement Merit-pay Programs in the Schools.
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Parents (6) and superintendents (5) have a greater frequency
of responses favorable to merit pay implementation than do
teachers, principals, and school board members with regards
to motivational factors influencing decisions to implement
merit-pay programs in the schools.

Teachers (4) have the

highest frequency of responses unfavorable to merit pay
implementation.

Teachers (4), principals (4), and school

board members (4) are "not sure" on more items than parents
(2) and superintendents (2).
Teachers indicated uncertainty with regards to:
merit pay would

imp~ove

a)

educational productivity by

motivating improved teacher performance (Item I-2) ; b)
merit pay would exploit teachers rather than provide
reasonable compensation for work done (Item I-3); and c)
merit pay would benefit teachers (Item I-4).

Teachers,

believe that general salary increases would improve teacher
performance at least as effectively as merit pay (Item I-7).
Parents, principals, and superintendents responded favorably
to Items I-2, I-3, and I-4, whereas parents, principals,
and school board members are "not sure" about Item I-7, and
superintendents disagree with teachers.
Parents and school board members were not sure with
regards to whether the solution of school problems unrelated
to financial incentives would have a greater effect on the
improvement of teacher performance than would merit pay
implementation.

Teachers, principals, and superintendents

gave responses unfavorable (agree) to merit pay
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implementation.

See Table 11.1, page 93 and Table 12, page

94 for a summary of favorable, unfavorable, and "not sure"
responses for Dimension I.
Dimension II.

Psychological Determinants Influ-

encing Improved Teacher Performance.

Parents (6), teachers

(7), and school board members (5) have the highest frequency
of "not sure" responses.

Principals (7) and superintendents

(6) have the highest frequency of responses favorable to
merit pay implementation.
All groups responded "not sure" to Item II-6:
school district practices would allow school administrators
to distribute merit-pay awards as soon as improved teacher
performance is documented.
(agree) to:

All groups responded favorably

in order to establish the relationship between

performance and merit-pay awards, merit-pay evaluations
would have to be conducted more frequently than once a year
(Item II-7).

Principals and superintendents respond

favorably to:

a) school administrators would have a

functional understanding of those reinforcement theories and
practices that relate to effective merit pay implementation
(agree)

(Item

II~8);

b) school administrators would be able

to determine when nonfinancial rewards more effectively
improve teacher performance than financial rewards (agree)
(Item II-9); and c) school administrators seldom reward
improved performance (disagree)

(Item II-10).

Teachers

agree that school administrators seldom reward improved
performance; parents and school board members are "not
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sure."

See Table 11.2, page 93 and Table 12, page 94 for a

summary of favorable, unfavorable, and "not sure" responses
for Dimension II.
Dimension III.

Evaluation Criteria to be Employed

for the Measurement of Teacher Performance Related to meritpay awards.

Parents (6), teachers (7), and school board

members (5) have the highest frequency of ''not sure"
responses.

Principals (7) and superintendents (7) have the

highest frequency of responses favorable to merit pay
implementation.
Favorable responses among groups are indicated for:
a) merit-pay evaluations would relate specifically to those
work elements the teacher has control over (Item III-1) ;
b) merit-pay evaluations would be determined solely by
school administrators (disagree)

(Item III-6); and c)

merit-pay awards may be made on the basis of quality as well
as quantity (Item III-13).

Parents, principals, and super-

intendents indtcate favorable responses to:

merit-pay

evaluations would be determined by teachers, school
administrators, and parents (Item III-4).
school board members are ''not sure."

Teachers and

Parents, principals,

and school board members responded unfavorably (agree) to:
teacher style, characteristics, and instructional method
would be the key elements used for merit-pay evaluations
(Item III-11) •
sure."

Teachers and superintendents were "not

In contrast to Item III-11, principals, superinten-

dents, and school board members responded favorably to:

90
student performance would be the key element used for the
development of teacher performance measures relating to
merit-pay awards (Item III-12).

Teachers responded

unfavorably (disagree) with item III-12 and parents were
"not sure."

See Table 11.3, page 93 and Table 12, page 94

for a summary of favorable, unfavorable, and "not sure"
responses for Dimension III.
Dimension IV.

Alternative Financial Strategies

Related to the Improvement of Functionally Incompetent
Teachers.

Parents (4) have the highest frequency of "not

sure" responses.

Teachers (6), principals (5), and superin-

tendents (5) have the greatest frequency of responses
favorable to merit pay implementation.
All groups responded favorably to:

a) financial

awards based on performance would improve the performance
of incompetent teachers (disagree)

(Item IV-1); guidance

and supervision by effective teachers would improve the
performance of incompetent teachers (agree)

(Item IV-6);

and c) incompetent teachers should be removed from the
classroom and placed in teacher development programs until
determined able to return to the_ classroom (agree)
IV-7).

Teachers responded favorably (disagree) to:

(Item
teacher

competency is the most critical issue bearing on educational
productiveness in the schools (Item IV-4).

All other groups

responded unfavorably (agree) with regards to Item IV-4.
School board members responses are unfavorable (agree) with
regards to:

dismissal would be the only appropriate action
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to be taken with regards to incompetent teachers.
groups are not sure.

All other

See Table 11.4, page 93 and Table 12,

page 94 for the summary of favorable, unfavorable, and
"not sure" responses for Dimension IV.
Dimension V.

School Administrative Responsibilities

Related to Merit Pay Implementation.

Teachers (8), princi-

pals (9), and superintendents (9) have the highest frequency
of responses favorable to merit pay implementation.

School

board members (4) have the greatest frequency of "not sure"
responses.

All group responses are favorable to:

a)

school

administrators would establish policies and procedures
simple enough for teachers to see the direct relationship
between merit-pay increases and performance (Item V-1);
b) school administrators would maintain lines of communications that would allow teachers to provide input about the
reasonableness and equity of performance expectations (Item
V-2); and c) school administrators would maintain merit-pay
programs in which teachers contribute to the design and
administration of the pr6gram (Item V-5); d) school
administrators would be committed to excellence through the
concerted effort to assure that only competent performance
is rewarded (Item V-7); and e) school administrators would
distribute merit-pay awards on the basis of the job requirements and who fills the job, rather than performance
(disagree)

(Item V-8).

Principals and superintendents

respond favorably to all items except Item V-4:

school

administrators would accept performance failures as their
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ultimate responsibility.

Principals responses are

unfavorable (disagree) to merit pay implementation and
superintendents are not sure.

Teachers, principals, and

superintendents respond favorably to:

a) school adminis-

trators would establis'h quotas limiting the number of
teachers that would receive merit-pay awards (disagree) and
b) schodl administrators would attempt to modify teacher
performance through the use of merit pay rather than
changing rules, management practices, or the job (disagree).
Parents and school board members are not sure with regards
to these issues.

See Table 11.5, page 94 and Table 12, page

94 for the summary of favorable, unfavorable, and "not sure"
responses for Dimension V.
Summary.

Across all dimensions, the total favor-

able, unfavorable, and "not sure" responses for each group
are:

a) parents (22, 6, 21); b) teachers (19, 8, 22); c)

principals (31, 7, 11); d) superintendents (32, 7, 10); and
e) school board members (21, 7, 21).

In terms of total

score, principals and superintendents reflect response
patterns largely favorable to merit pay implementation.
Teachers, parents, and school board members are less favorable to merit pay implementation with a high frequency of
"not sure" responses as part of their response pattern.
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Table 11
Summary Tables for Favorable, Unfavorable and
Not Sure Responses for Individual Items
Table 11 • 1 • Favorable, Unfavorable, and Not Sure Responses:
Motivational Factors Influencing Decisions to
Implement Merit-pay Programs In the Schools
1 ·2

Parents
Teachers
Principals
Superintendents
School Board M~mbers

Table 11.2.
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Favorable, Unfavorable, and Not Sure Responses:
Psychological Determinants Influencing
Improved Teacher Perforamce
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Teachers
Principals
Superintendents
School Board Members

1

2
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N
N
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Table 11 .3. Favorable, Unfavorable, and Not Sure Responses: Evaluation
Criteria to be Employed for the Measurement of Teacher
Relating to Merit-pay Awards
Parents
Teachers
Principals
Superintendents
School Board Members

5

6

7

8

9

2
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Table 11 .4. Favorable, Unfavorable, and Not Sure Responses:
Alternative Financial Strategies Related to the
Improvement of Functionally Incompetent Teachers
1

Parents
Teachers
Principals
Superintendents
School Board Members

F
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F
F
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F
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Table 11.1.

Favorable, Unfavorable, and Not Sure Responses:
School Administrative Responsibilities
Related to Merit Pay Implementation

Parents
Teachers
Principals
Superintendents
School Board Members
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Table 12
Survey Items and Respondent's Favorable, Unfavorable,
and Not Sure Responses to Items
I.

MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING DECISIONS TO
IMPLEMENT MERIT-PAY PROGRAMS IN THE SCHOOLS.

FAVORABLE NOT SURE

1.

Political endorsement of merit· pay implementation In the schools is to satisfy political
purposes rather than improvement of educational quality.

Pa

Pr, S,
SB

2.

Merit pay would improve educational quality
by motivating improved teacher performance.

Pa, Pr,
S, SB

T

3.

Merit-pay programs would exploit teachers
rather than provide reasonable compensation for work done.

Pa, Pr,
S, SB

T

4.

Merit-pay would benefit teachers.

T

5.

Parents would benefit from merit pay
Implementation.

Pa, Pr,
S, SB
Pa

6.

The performance gains achieved as a result of
merit pay Implementation would justify the
additional finances required to maintain a
merit-pay program.

Pa, S

7.

General salary increases would improve teacher
performance at least as effectively as
merit-pay awards.

s

8.

The solution of school problems unrelated
to financial Incentives would have a greater
effect on the Improvement of teacher
performance than would merit pay implementation.

Pr, S
SB

UNFAVORABLE
T

T

T, Pr,

SB

Pa, Pr
SB

T

Pa, SB

T, Pr, S
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II.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS INFLUENCING
IMPROVED TEACHER PERFORMANCE.

1.

Merit-pay awards would Improve teacher
performance only if current salaries are
perceived as Inadequate to meet the
teacher's basic needs.

Pr, S

Pa, T
SB

2.

Merit-pay awards would have little effect
on the performance of teachers who have
social or self-actualization needs.

Pr

Pa, T

3.

Teachers who establish their own standard
of performance excellence would be
positively Influenced by merit-pay awards.

4.

Merit-pay awards would have little effect
on the performance of teachers who have
security, status, or esteem needs.

5.

Merit-pay awards would more likely Improve
the performance of those teachers who have
low achievement needs.

SB

s
T

Pr, S

Pa, Pr,
S, SB

Pa, T
SB
T, Pr

Pa, S

SB
Pa, T
Pr, S
SB

6.

School district payrol I practices would
allow school administrators to distribute
merit-pay awards as soon as Improved
teacher performance Is documented.

7.

In order to establish the relationship
between performance and mrlt-pay awards,
evaluations would have to be conducted
more frequently than once a year.

Pa, T, Pr,
S, SB

8.

School administrators would have a
functional understanding of those
reinforcement theories and practices
that relate to effective merit pay
Implementation.

Pa, Pr,
S, SB

T

9.

School administrators would be able to
determine when nonfinancial rewards more
effectively Improve teacher performance
than financial rewards.

Pr, S,
SB

Pa

T

School administrators seldom reward
Improved teacher performance.

Pr, S

Pa,
SB

T

T, Pr,

Pa, S

10.

Ill.

EVALUATION CRITERIA TO BE EMPLOYED FOR
THE MEASUREMENT OF TEACHER PERFORMANCE
RELATING TO MERIT-PAY AWARDS.

1.

Merit-pay evaluation would relate speclfical ly
to those work elements the teacher has
control over.

2.

Teacher performance ratings relating to meritpay awards would be based only on those work
elements that can be objectively measured.

Pa, T, Pr,
S, SB

SB
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Pa, T,

Subjective performance measures would be
acceptable for determining merit-pay
e I I g Ib I I I ty.

Pr, SB

Merit-pay evaluation measures would be
determined by teachers, school administrators, and parents.

Pa, Pr,

5.

Merit-pay evaluation measures would be
determined by teachers and school
administrators.

s

6.

Merit-pay evaluation measures would be
determined solely by school administrators.

Pa, T,
Pr, S,
SB

7.

Merit-pay evaluations would be conducted
solely by school administrative personnel
rather than by a panel of teachers and
school administrators.

Pa, T

Pr, S,
SB

8.

Merit-pay evaluation measures would be based
upon organizational objectives set forth by
school officials.

Pr, S

Pa, T
SB

9.

Merit-pay evaluations would include
teacher performance evaluations made
by parents.

Pa

10.

Merit-pay ratings would refer only to the
performance of teachers carrying out their
normal classroom duties.

Pa, T

Pr, S, SB

11.

Teacher style, characteristics, and
instructional method would be the
elements used for merit-pay evaluations.

T, S

Pa, Pr, SB

12.

Student performance would be the key
element used for the development of
measures relating to merit-pay awards.

Pr, S, SB

T

Pa

13.

Merit-pay awards may be made on the
basis of quality as well as quantity.

Pa, T, Pr,
S, SB

3.

4.

IV.

s
T, SB

s
Pa, T~
Pr, SB

T, Pr, S

SB.

ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL STRATEGIES RELATED
TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF FUNCTIONALLY
INCOMPETENT TEACHERS.

1.

Financial awards based on performance would
Improve the performance of Incompetent teachers.

Pa, T, Pr,
S, SB

2.

Failure to receive merit-pay awards would
cause incompetent teachers to seek ways to
Improve their performance.

T, S

Pa, Pr,
SB

3.

Failure to receive merit-pay awards would
cause incompetent teachers to leave the
teaching profession.

T, Pr, S

Pa, SB
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4.

Teacher competency Is the most critical
Issue bearing on educational productiveness
in the schools.

T

5.

Financial awards based on the acquisition of
new knowledge and improvement of teaching
ski I I would Improve the performance of
Incompetent teachers.

Pr, SB

6.

Guidance and supervision by effective teachers
would Improve the performance of incompetent
teachers.

Pa, T, Pr,
S, SB

7.

Incompetent teachers should be removed from
the classroom and placed in teacher development programs until determined able to return
to the classroom.

Pa, T, Pr,
S, SB

8.

Dismissal would be the only appropriate action
to be taken with regards to Incompetent teachers.

V.

Pa, Pr, S,
SB
Pa, T,

s

Pa, T,
Pr, S

SB

SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED
TO MERIT PAY IMPLEMENTATION.

1.

School administrators would establish policies
and procedures simple enough for teachers to
see the direct relationship between meritpay Increases and performance.

Pa, T, Pr,
S, SB

2.

School administrators would maintain lines
of communications that allow teachers to
provide input about the reasonableness
and equity of performance expectations.

Pa, T, Pr,
S, SB

3.

School administrators would establish quotas
limiting the number of teachers that would
receive merit-pay awards.

T, Pr, S

4.

School administrators would accept
performance failures as their ultimate
responsibility.

5.

School administrators would maintain meritpay programs In which teachers contribute
to the design and administration of the
program.

Pa, T, Pr,
S, SB

6.

School administrators would maintain a
committment to spend the time and effort
necessary to maintain an effective
merit-pay program.

Pa, T, Pr,
S, SB

7.

School administrators would be committed
to excellence through the concerted effort
to assure that only competent performance
is rewarded.

Pa, T, Pr,
S, SB

8.

School administrators would distribute
merit-pay awards on the basis of the job
requirements and who fills the job
rather than performance.

Pa, T, Pr,
S, SB

Pa, SB

T, S,
SB

Pa, Pr
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9.

10.

School administrators would set merit-pay
rates and redefine performance
expectations in order to control the
amount of compensation to be received
by teachers.

T, Pr, S

Pa, SB

School administrators would attempt to modify
teacher performance through the use of
merit pay rather than changing rules,
management practices, or the job.

Pr, S

Pa, T.
SB

Supplementary Analyses
Four additional analyses were conducted in order to
identify differences that may exist within groups.
following analyses relating to:

The

a) responses differences

relating to the respondents' definition merit pay; b)
response differences relating to the respondents' perceptions regarding the effect merit pay would have on interpersonal relations in the schools; c) responses differences
relating to the respondents' sex; and d) age are
descriptive, and should be treated as informative and
suggest possible considerations for future research.
Differences within the parents group are suggested
regarding:

motiyational factors influencing decisions to

implement merit pay programs in the schools with regards to
how respondents.' define merit pay.

Parents (4.87), defining

merit pay as additional compensation for improved performance agreed that merit pay would improve school
productivity and benefit the school community's
constituents, whereas those parents (3.63), selecting one of
the alternate definitions were not sure.
Differences were noted for:

school administrative
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responsibilities relating to merit pay implementation.
Those teachers (4.76) defining merit pay as additional
compensation for improved performance agreed that school
administrators would maintain effective merit-pay programs,
whereas teachers (4.43) choosing an alternate definition
were not sure.
Principals and school board members also indicated
differences for:

school administrative responsibilities

related to merit pay implementation.

Principals (5.27)

and school board members (5.13) indicating that merit pay
was additional compensation for improved performance were
in agreement that school administrators would maintain
effective merit-pay programs, whereas those principals
(4.63) and school board members (4.53) selecting an
alternate definition were less certain.
Differences were also noted for principals defining
merit pay as additional compensation for improved performance with regards to:

motivational factors influencing

decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the schools.
Principals (4.24)

selecting the merit pay definition were

not sure, whereas those principals selecting an alternate
definition (3.50) tended to disagree that merit pay would
improve educational productivity and benefit school
community members.
Differences were noted for all groups regarding
their perceptions about the effects merit pay would have on
interpersonal relations in the schools.

·with regards to
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motivational factors influencing decisions to implement
merit-pay programs in the schools, parents (2.55) and
teachers (2.41), indicating that there will be adverse
effects on interpersonal relations, disagree that educational productivity will be improved and school community
members will benefit as a result of merit pay implementation.

In contrast, those parents indicating that there

would be no significant changes (4.76) or there will be a
positive effect on interpersonal relations (5.27) agree with
the above.

Teachers indicating there will be no significant

changes, interpersonal relations will be positively affected
or did not know (4.48), were not sure whether merit pay
would improve educational productivity or benefit the school
community's members.

Principals indicating there would be

no significant changes (5.21) or interpersonal relations
would be positively affected (5.12), agree that merit-pay
programs would improve educational productivity and benefit
the members of the school community.

Similarily, superin-

tendents indicating there would be adverse effects on
interpersonal relations (3.92) were not sure, whereas those
superintendents indicating no significant changes (5.23) or
that merit pay would have positive effects on interpersonal
relations (5.35), agree that merit pay would improve
educational productivity and benefit the school community's
constituents.

School board members indicating adversive

effects resulting from merit pay implementation (3.81) were
not sure, but those school board members indicating that
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there would be positive effects on interpersonal relations
(5.27) or did not know (5.38), agree that merit pay will
positively effect educational productivity and benefit
the school community's members.
Differences were also noted between school board
members with regards to:

school administrative responsi-

bilities related to merit pay implementation.

In those

cases where school board members indicated adversive effects
on interpersonal relations (3.97) or that there would be no
significant differences (4.44), were not sure about the
school administrator's ability to maintain an effective
merit-pay program.

Those school board members indicating

merit pay would have a positive effect on interpersonal
relations (4.67), agree with the above.
Teachers

indic~ting

that merit pay will

h~ve

adverse

effects on interpersonal relations (4.95), appeared to be
more cognizant of the effects merit pay would have on
incompetent teachers, whereas teachers indicating positive
effects were not sure (4.21)

~

Parents, teachers, superintendents, and school board
members indicated differences with regards to:

school

administrative responsibilities related to merit pay
implementation.

Parents were not sure (4.43) when they

indicated that merit pay would have an adverse effect on
interpersonal relations.

Those parents indicating that

there will be positive effects on interpersonal relations,
or did not know (5.27), agree that superintendents will
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maintain effective merit-pay programs.

Teachers responding

that there will be adverse effects on interpersonal
relations were not sure (4.39), whereas teachers indicating
there would be no significant changes or did not know
(5.31),

~elt

programs.

superintendents would maintain effective

Although superintendents were in agreement that

they would maintain effective merit-pay programs in the
schools, those superintendents indicating that there would
be positive effects on interpersonal relations (5.70) were
more committed than those who indicated there would be
adversive effects on interpersonal relations (4.68).

School

board members, indicating that merit pay would have adverse
effects on interpersonal relations in the schools (4.24),
were not sure about the superintendent's committment to an
effective merit-pay program, whereas those indicating that
merit pay would have a positive effect on interpersonal
relations (5.34), agree that superintendents will maintain
effective merit-pay programs.
Important differences were noted for teachers only
with regards to differences in response patterns by sex.
Male respondents were not sure (4.36) about the school
administrator's ability to maintain effective merit-pay programs in the schools.

The female respondents (5.07) agree

that superintendents would maintain effective programs.
Response differences were an issue with regards to
age for:

motivational factors influencing decisions to

implement merit-pay programs in the schools.

For parents,
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the age group ranging from 41 or older (5.12), were more
likely to agree that merit pay would improve educational
productivity and benefit the school community's members
than the age groups ranging from 20-40 (4.66).

The response

differences noted for principals indicates that the principals in the 31-50 group are more likely to agree (4.53)
than those in the 50 or older group (4.02) who were not
sure that merit-pay programs would benefit the school
community's members and improve educational productivity.
School board members ranging in ages 20-50 were more likely
to agree that merit pay would improve educational
productivity and benefit the school community's members
(4.98) than those 51 or older (4.54).
Differences by age were also noted for principals
with regards to:

school administrative responsibilities

related to merit pay implementation.

Those principals

ranging from 31-40 years of age, although in agreement that
school administrators would maintain effective merit-pay
programs, were less committed (5.02) than those ranging
between 41-50 years of age (5.52).
SUMMARY
The hypotheses that there are no differences between
groups within dimensions, and there are no differences
between dimensions within groups, were tested.

In addition,

an analysis of individual items was carried out in order to
identify differences between groups with regards to
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responses to individual items.
Two hypotheses relating to group differences were
rejected.

Teachers differed significantly from parents,

principals, superintendents, and school board members with
regards to:

a) motivational factors influencing decisions

to implement merit pay programs in the schools; and b)
psychological determinants influencing improved teacher
performance.

Teachers disagree that merit pay will improve

educational productivity and benefit the school district's
members, whereas parents, superintendents, and school board
members agree that merit pay will have a positive effect on
the productivity in the schools and benefit the school
districts members.
about these issues.

Principals, however, were not sure
Principals responded favorably to the

psychological determinants influencing improved teacher
performance, whereas parents, teachers, superintendents,
and school board members were not sure whether the
motivational factors and reinforcement principles would
improve teacher performance.

Although differences were

obtained between teachers and parents, superintendents, and
school board members, the differences were one of magnitude
within the "not sure" response range, where teachers'
responses were less favorable.
No differences between parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board members were indicated for:

a) evaluation criteria to be employed for the

measurement of teacher performance relating to merit-pay
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awards; b) alternative strategies related to the improvement
of functionally incompetent teachers; and c) school administrative responsibilities related to merit pay implementation.

Although significant differences were not determined

at the dimension-level analysis, an examination of individual items revealed a large number of differences among
groups.for:

a) evaluation criteria to be employed for the

measurement of teacher performance relating to merit-pay
awards; and b) alternative financial strategies related to
the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers.
Furthermore, with the exception of:

school administrative

responsibilities related to merit pay implementation, all
dimensions exhibited considerable variation among groups
with regards to the individual items included in each
dimension.
Dimension differences were found for all groups.
One pair of dimension differences occurred in all groups.
Parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and school
board members responded less favorably to:

psychological

determinants influencing improved teacher performance than
school administrative responsibilities related to merit pay
implementation.

Teachers, principals, superintendents, and

school board members responded less favorably to:

evalua-

tion criteria to be employed for the measurement of teacher
performance relating to merit-pay awards, than school
administrative responsibilities relating to merit pay
implementation.

In addition, parents, principals,
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superintendents, and school board members responded less
favorably to:

alternative financial strategies related to

the improvement of functionaliy incompetent teachers, than
school administrative responsibilities related to merit pay
implementation.
Factors causing within group variation were
suggested for future consideration.

How the respondent

defined merit pay, how the respondent perceived the effects
that merit pay would have on interpersonal relations in the
schools, the respondents' sex and age, may be considerations
with regards to:

a) motivational factors influencing

decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the schools;
b) school administrative responsibilities related to merit
pay implementation; and c) alternative financial strategies
relat~d

to the improvement of the functionally incompetent

teacher.
The conclusions, discussion, and recommendations
are presented in chapter 5.

Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Merit pay, conceptually, is a procedure by which
employees are awarded extra compensation in accordance with
degrees of performance improvements exceeding the organization's acceptable performance standards.

Proposals have

been made to install merit-pay programs in the schools as a
method to improve the schools' productivity in general, and
improve teacher performance specifically.

However, within

the framework of education; merit pay is a controversial
issue, requiring an in depth examination of those factors
contributing to successful merit pay implementation.
Within the school district, five groups have been
identified that play an important role with regards to
merit pay implementation in the schools.
a) parents, b) teachers, c) principals, d)
and e) school board members.

These groups are:
superintendents,

Because these groups have

different functions within the school setting, the
determination of differences in their perceptions about
what would occur in the schools, relative to a variety of
issues relevant to successful merit-pay programs, is an
essential first step to be taken prior to the program's
installation.
The implications of the study within the context
of the above discussion are presented in the following:
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1) Conclusions; 2) Discussion; and 3) Recommendations.
Conclusions
Differences were found between groups in two of the
five dimensions identified for the study.

In Dimension I,

teachers were found to be less favorable towards motivational factors influencing decisions to implement merit-pay·
programs in the schools.

Dimension II--psychological

determinants influencing improved teacher performance-teachers and principals took polar positions, where teachers
were not sure and principals provided responses favorable to
merit-pay implementation.

Both teachers' and principals'

responses were significantly different from parents,
superintendents, and school board members.
not found between groups with regards to:

Differences were
a) Dimension

III--evaluation criteria to be employed for the measurement
of teacher performance relating to merit-pay awards;
b)

Dimension IV--alternative financial strategies related

to the improvement of incompetent teachers; and c) Dimension
V--school administrative responsibilities related to merit
pay implementation.
Teachers responded less favorably than did parents,
principals, superintendents, and school board members to
Dimension I.

Essentially, teachers did not believe that

merit pay would improve educational productivity or benefit
the school community members.

In contrast, parents,

principals, superintendents, and school board members
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believed that merit pay would improve educational productivity and benefit the school community members.
Teachers' and principals' responses were significantly different from those of parents, superintendents,
and school board members with regards to Dimension II.
However, teachers responded less favorably than did parents,
principals, superintendents, and school board members.
The principals' responses were more favorable than were
those of parents, teachers, superintendents, and school
board members.

The difference between teachers and parents,

superintendents, and school board members are less significant in-as-much as these groups were considered to have
given responses indicating uncertainty with regards to
those issues contained in Dimension II.

Principals,

however, are significant in-as-much as their responses are
considered favorable to the issues found in Dimension II.
This suggests, that principals exhibit, a greater knowledge
of motivators and confidence that the appropriate reinforcement procedures will be applied in the schools.
Parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and
school board members indicated uncertainty with regards to
the evaluation criteria to be employed for the measurement
of teacher performance relating to merit-pay awards.
Caution must be taken not to assume that there were no
differences in terms of individual item responses.

There

were only three issues in which all groups provided
favorable responses.

They are:

a) merit-pay evaluations
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would relate specifically to those work elements the
teacher has control over; b) merit-pay evaluation measures
would [not] be determined solely by school administrators;
and c) merit-pay awards may be made on the basis of quality
as well as quantity.

The remaining responses were diverse,

thereby indicating that evaluation procedures are not
clearly enough defined to result in consistency among the
groups.
Although no differences were indicated between
groups for Dimension IV--alternative strategies related to
the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers--an
examination of individual items indicate that teachers
and principals may be more cognizant of the effects merit
pay would have on the improvement of the incompetent
teacher's performance, and the alternative strategies that
would productively improve the incompetent teacher's
performance than are parents, superintendents, and school
board members.
The responses for Dimension v--administrative
responsibilities related to merit pay implementation--are
consistent with respect to parents', teachers', principals',
superintendents', and school board members' confidence that
school administrators would take the necessary steps to
maintain an effective merit-pay program.

Although the

parents and teachers responses are less favorable than
principals, superintendents, and school board members,
an examination of individual items support the consistency
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of item responses favorable to merit pay.
At this juncture, recommendations favoring the
implementation of merit-pay programs in the schools should
be set aside temporarily.

Both the dimension-level and

item-level analysis suggest that sufficient differences
exist between groups to warrant the development of information programs directed at reconciling important
differences found between groups.
To further complicate matters, differences are
found between dimensions within groups.

By treating the

dimensions as a developmental sequence for the design of
merit-pay programs, sufficient differences exist between
the dimensions for all groups indicating weak points along
the sequence that should be remedied prior to merit pay
implementation.
of groups are:

The weaknesses found common to the majority
a) psychological determinants influencing

improved teacher performance; b) evaluation criteria to be
employed for the measurement of teacher performance relating
to merit-pay awards; and G) alternative financial strategies
related to the improvement of functionally incompetent
teachers.

This implies that even though there is general

support in terms of:

a) motivational factors influencing

decisions to implement merit-pay programs in the schools;
and b) school administrative responsibilities related to
merit pay implementation; failure of the groups to express
certainty favorable to merit pay implementation in the
preceding three dimensions makes the program's success
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suspect.
Finally, the principal assumption made was that all
groups across all dimensions must have response patterns
favorable to merit pay implementation.
were not demonstrated.

These prerequisites

Contrary to the above assumption,

Dimension II, Dimension III, and Dimension IV did not meet
the above criteria since all group responses reflect
uncertainty with regards to what would occur in the schools
relative to those issues making up each dimension.
In retrospect, there is, at this time, no basis for
suggesting that effective merit-pay programs would be
successfully installed in the California schools.

This does

not mean that consideration of merit pay should be
abandoned, but rather, there is still considerable work to
be done in order to assure that parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and school board members arrive at
some agreement with regards to issues important to successful merit pay implementation.
Discussion
Merit pay implementation requires that there be
sufficient trust and cooperation between school officials
and teachers.

Within the school setting this position can

be extended to include parents who would both contribute to
the maintenance of the program and derive benefits as a
result of improved education for their children.
In order to improve the trust and

cooper~tion,

and
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confidence among the participants in the school district's
merit-pay program, perceptual congruence should be achieved
between parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and
school board members that is favorable to merit pay with
regards to those issues addressed by this study.

An impor-

tant issue confronting the installation.of a merit pay
program in the schools are those attitudes held by teachers
regarding their contention that merit pay would not improve
educational productivity nor benefit the school community
members.

A change in this attitude would seem necessary.

However, the responsibility to initiate this change in the
teacher's attitude must be shared by all groups in-as-much
as the groups must be in agreement with respect to the
evaluation procedures to be employed and how teacher
incompetence is to be dealt with.

Without consistency in

these two areas, there is no reason to expect that teacher
attitude changes will occur.
The recurrent theme emphasized in the literature
refers to the establishment of standards by which a link
between performance and pay can be made.

Consequently,

the focal point is the development of school district
expectations specifying what the school district's outcomes
are to be.

Once these expectations are determined, made

known, and agreed upon by parents, teachers, principals,
superintendents, and school board members, the distinction
between evaluations pertaining to organizational membership
and performance (outcomes) can be made.
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As the evaluation procedures become more clearly
defined relative to the expectations (outcomes), procedures
for dealing with teacher incompetence begin to fall in place
because the causes of teacher incompetence can be more
readily identified.

Consequently, the teacher's expecta-

tions should change with regards to their unfavorable
position taken towards merit pay's ability to influence
increased educational productiveness and the provision of
benefits to the school community members.
Essentially, steps should be taken that will assure
the congruence between groups relative to what the schools
are to achieve, from which, decisions can be made relative
to those issues important to effective merit pay
implementation.

Without the achievement of favorable

perceptual congruence among parents, teachers, principals,·
superintendents, and school board members regarding those
issues important to merit pay implementation, the likelihood
of installing a successful merit-pay program becomes
severely diminished.
Recommendations
The study has identified important differences
between parents, teachers, principals, superintendents, and
school board members regarding issues important to merit pay
implementation.

Additional research is required in order

to clarify the attitudes expressed by groups with regards
to these issues.

As a result, more intensive studies by
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groups are called for.
Although differences were found between groups
further studies are required to confirm the results of this
study.

However, future studies should focus on the

clarification of group perceptions as they relate to:
a) the respondents' definition of merit pay; b) the respondents' perception about the effect merit pay will have on
interpersonal relations in the schools; c) the respondents'
sex; and d) the respondents' age.
In addition, research should be conducted to compare
response behaviors resulting from regional characteristics
which may be a function of the community's economic base-a) agriculture, b) commerce, c) industry, and d)
technology.

There appear .to be levels of conservatism

that may play an important role with regards to the
acceptance or rejection of issues important to merit pay
implementation.
Teachers were the only group that disagreed with
the assumption that merit pay would improve educational
productiveness and benefit the school district's constituents.

A relationship between the teachers' rejection

of this premise may be directly related to the absence
of definitive evaluation procedures and methods for handling
teacher incompetence.

Studies designed to measure the rate

of attitude change relative to precisely defined standards
would be beneficial to the design of merit-pay programs.
Furthermore, the examination of the internal
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consistency of the survey instrument suggests, and was
confirmed by the various data analyses, that there was
considerable response variation by groups within:

a)

psychological determinants influencing improved teacher
performance; b) evaluation criteria to be employeq for
the measurement of teacher performance relating to meritpay awards; and c) alternative financial strategies related
to the improvement of functionally incompetent teachers.
Research designs that pre- and post-test, with an
intervening information period relative to merit pay issues,
would help distinguish whether the variation was due to the
items; or whether the variation was due to lack of
knowledge of merit-pay concepts, lack of uniformity within
education regarding educational standards, or the
respondents' experience within the school district.
Concluding Comment
In the absence of promotional opportunities in
education, merit pay can serve as a powerful motivator,
enhancing school productivity while providing recognition
and financial benefit to those teachers excelling in their
work.

However, in order to achieve these objectives,

precise definitions of the school's outcomes are required
from which suitable performance measures can be derived.
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November 8, 1984

--------------------------- ,

Superintendent
School District
93001

Dear
The success of merit-pay programs adopted by school districts
is affected by those opinions held by the constituents within
the school community. Decisions regarding the implementation
of merit pay centers on whether the differences expressed by
parents, teachers, principals, central office administrators,
and school board members can be reconciled. By identifying
those differences expressed, reconciliation becomes more
likely and as a result, a merit-pay program's chance for
success is improved.
Currently, I am enrolled at the University of the Pacific,
Stockton, California, and in the dissertation phase of my
doctoral studies. Your assisatance in the distribution of
the questionnaire and the selection of a parent, teacher, and
school board member respondent would be appreciated in order
that I may identify these differences and provide you with
a summary of the results.
Enclosed is a self-addressed post card on which you may
indicate your interest in participating in the study.
Immediately following your reply, a packet containning the
questionnaires and selection criteria will be mailed.
Sincerely yours,

William J. Hoff
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Dear Mr. Hoff:
[]

Please send the questionnaires.
will be happy to participate in
the study.

[]

I am sorry but I do not wish to
participate in the study.

Comments:
Date:

------ ,

00-00-N

1984
Name

I
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October 15, 1984

Dear
Thank you for taking part in the study. With your
assistance and support the study will generate information
useful to the design of an effective merit-pay program.
Five groups were identified for the study. They are:
a) Parents, b) Teachers, c) Principals, d) Central Office
Administrators, and e) School Board Members. Please select
the respondents and distribute the questionnaires as follows:
1.
2.
3.

Fill out questionnaire addressed to you.
Give a questionnaire to
, Principal.
Select and give questionnaires to:
a.
b.

c.

School Board Member--select the 4th school board
member from your list of board members.
Teachers--select the 20th teacher from your
list of teachers.
For ease of distribution the
teacher may be selected from the Principal's
school site.
Parents--select the 14th parent from the above
teacher's student list.

Should you feel it necessary to modify the selection
criteria, do so, but attempt to observe randomness of
selection.
In the event that it is necessary to follow-up a
respondent because a questionnaire has not been returned,
please keep a record of the respondents.
School Board Member:

---------------------------------

Teacher:---------------------------Parent:

------------------------------

Following the completion of the data analysis, a
summary of the results will be mailed to you.
Sincerely yours,
William J. Hoff
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October 15, 1984

Dear Participant:
Merit pay has been given renewed consideration as an
effective way to improve teacher performance in the schools.
However, prior to the adoption of a merit-pay plan, issues
affecting successful merit pay implementation are to be
considered.
Essential to the development of sound merit-pay programs
is the input of opinions expressed by those who are to
benefit from the program. Your opinions on those issues
presented in the enclosed questionnaire are improtant.tq the
design of an effective merit-pay program.
Please complete the questionnaire and return promptly
using the attached self-addressed, postage paid envelope.
All individual responses will be treated as confidential
communications between the researcher and the participant.
Thank you for taking the time from your busy schedule
and contributing to the research being undertaken.
Sincerely yours,

William J. Hoff
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December 5, 1984

Dear
A preliminary examination of the data suggest a wide
variety of differences among the respondents with regards to
a number of issues addressed by the questionnaire related to
merit pay. Enclosed are trends that appear to be emerging
for several issues frequently discussed in the literature.
However, conclusive statements can not be made until the
outstanding questionnaires are returned.
I have received your questionnaire along with the
Teacher and Principal respondents.
Responses from the
Parent and School Board Member respondents have not been
received.
Enclosed are additional questionnaires in case the
respondents have misplaced the first questionnaire
distributed. Sometimes irregularities arise that cannot
be controlled for.
Should a respondent not wish to
participate, please select a substitute respondent.
Thank you for taking the time from your busy schedule
and providing the assistance needed to conduct this
study.
Sincerely yours,

William J. Hoff
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December 5, 1984

Dear
A request was made asking your assistance in the
selection of respondents and the distribution of questionnaires for a merit-pay study directed at determining the
differences among parents, teachers, principals,
superintendents, and school board members on issues important
to merit pay implementation. The questionnaires were mailed
to you. As of this date, I have not received any responses
from your district.
It is understood, with the demands placed on your time,
priorities must be set, giving emphasis to the most pressing
school .matters. Your participation is needed in order that
I meet the deadlines set for the completion of the study.
Please give the questionnaires your immediate attention.
Enclosed are trends that appear to be emerging for
several issues frequently discussed in the literature.
However, conclusive statements can not be made until the
outstanding questionnaires are returned.
I am looking forward to hearing from you soon.
Sincerely yours,

William J. Hoff

APPENDIX II
SURVEY INSTRUMENT

PERCEPTUAL DETERMINANTS AFFECTING MERIT PAY IMPLEMENTATION
IN CALIFORNIA SCHOOL DISTRICTS

INSTRUCTIONS: The following questlonaire consists of five dimensions containing statements related
to merit pay Implementation in the schools. Please check either a 3, 2, 1, 0, -1, -2, or -3 as your
choice relates to your degree of agreement or disagreement with each statement's relevance to merit
pay Implementation. Choices 3, 2, and 1. indicate your degree of agreement; choices -1, -2, and -3
Indicate your degree of disagreement; and zero (0) indicates "not sure." The time required to
complete the questionaire Is approximately 15 MINUTES.

I•

MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING DECISIONS TO
IMPLEMENT MERIT-PAY PROGRAMS IN THE SCHOOLS.

s~~\:

AGREE

DISAGREE

1•

Political endorsement of merit pay Implementation in
the schools is to satisfy political purposes rather
than improvement of educational productivity.

(31

[21

[ 11

£01

£-11

[-21

[-31

2.

Merit pay would improve educational productivity by
motivating Improved teacher performance.

(31

(21

[1]

[OJ

(-11

[-21

[-31

3.

Merit-pay programs would exploit teachers rather than
provide reasonable compensation for work done.

[31

!21

[ 1J

!OJ

[-11

[-21

(-31

4.

Merit-pay programs would benefit teachers.

£3)

(21

[1]

[01

(-11

t-21

[-31

5.

Parents would benefit from merit pay implementation.

[31

[21

[1]

[0]

[-11

[-21

[-31

6.

The performance gains achieved as a result of merit
pay Implementation would Justify the additional
finances required to maintain a merit-pay program.

[31

[21

[11

[01

[-11

[-21

[-31

7.

General salary increases would improve teacher
performance at least as effectively as merit-pay awards.

[3]

[21

[1]

[0]

[-11

[-21

[-31

8.

The solution of school problems unrelated to financial
incentives would have a greater effect on the
improvement of teacher performance than would merit
pay Implementation.

(31

[2]

[ 11 [01

[-1]

[-21

[-31

I I • PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS INFLUENCING IMPROVED
TEACHER PERFORMANCE.
1.

Merit-pay awards would Improve teacher performance
only If current salaries are perceived as Inadequate
to meet the teacher's basic needs.

{31

[21

[11

{01

[-11

[-21

[-31

2.

Merit-pay awards would have little effect on the
performance of teachers who have social or
self-actualization needs.

[31

[21

[ 11

(0]

[-11

[-21

[-31

3.

Teachers who establish their own standards of
performance excel fence would be positively
influenced by merit-pay awards.

[3]

!21

[ 11

!OJ

(-11

[-21

[-31

4.

Merit-pay awards would have little effect on the
performance of teachers who have security, status,
or esteem needs.

£31

[21

( 11 [0]

[-1]

[-21

[-31

5.

Merit-pay awards would more I ikely .improve the
performance of those teachers who have low
achievement motivation.

£31

[21

[1]

[0]

[-1]

[-21

[-31

6.

School district payroll practices would allow
school administrators to distribute merit-pay
awards as soon as improved teacher performance
Is documented.

£31

£21

[11

[01

[-1!

[-21

[-31

7.

In order to establish the relationship between
performance and merit-pay awards, merit-pay
evaluations would have to be conducted more
frequently than once a year.

[31

[ 21

[11

[OJ

[-11

[-21

[-31

a.

School administrators would have a functional
understanding of those reinforcement theories.
and practices that relate to effective merit
pay Implementation.

[31

[21

[1]

[01

[-11

[-21

[-31

9.

School administrators would be able to determine
when nonfinancial rewards more effectively improve
teacher performance than financial rewards.

!31

[21

[ 1]

[0]

[-1 1 [-21

(-31

School administrators seldom reward Improved
teacher performance.

(3]

[21

[lJ

[01

[-11

(-21

(-31

10.

-----I II • EVALUATION CRITERIA TO BE EMPLOYED FOR THE
MEASUREMENT OF TEACHER PERFORMANCE RELATING
TO MERIT-PAY AWARDS.
1•

Merit-pay evaluation would relate specifically to
those work elements the teacher has control over.

£31

!21

[ 11

(01

(-1 J

[-21

[-31

2.

Teacher performance ratings relating to merit-pay
awards would be based only on those work elements
that can be objectively measured.

(3]

(21

[ 1 1 [01

[-11

[-21

[-31

3.

Subjective performance measures would be acceptable
for determining merit-pay eligibility.

[3]

[2]

[1]

[01

[-1]

[-21

[-31

4.

Merit-pay evaluation measures would be determined
by teachers, school administrators, and parents.

[3]

[2J

[ 1]

[01

!-11

(-21

[-31

5.

Merit-pay evaluation measures would be determined
by teachers and school administrators.

[31

[2]

[lJ

(OJ

[-11

[-21

(-31

6.

Merit-pay evaluation measures would be determined
solely by school administrators.

!31

[2J

[1]

[0]

[-11

[-21

[-31

7.

Merit-pay evaluations would be conducted solely by
school administrative personnel rather than by a
panel of teachers and school administrators.

[31

[2]

[1 J

[01

[-11

[-21

[-31

a.

Merit-pay evaluation measures would be based upon
organizational objectives set forth by school off icl a Is.

[31

[21

[11

[01

[-11

[-21

[-3J

9.

Merit-pay evaluations would Include teacher
performance evaluations made by parents.

[31

[21

( 1J

[01

(-11

[-21

[-31

10.

Merit-pay ratings would refer only to the performance
of the teachers carrying out their normal classroom
duties.

[31

[21

(1]

[01

(-11

(-21

[-31

11.

Teacher style, characteristics, and instructional
method would be the elements used for merit-pay
evaluations.

(3]

[2J

[11

[01

[··11

[-21

(-31

2

12.

Student performance would be the key element used
for the development of teacher performance
measures relating to merit-pay awards.

£31

£21

£11

COJ

C-11

[-21

C-3

13.

Merit-pay awards may be made on the basis of
quality of performance as wei I as quantity.

[31

!21

[11

[01

[-11

[-21

[-3j

IV. ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL STRATEGIES RELATED TO THE
IMPROVEMENT OF FUNCTIONALLY INCOMPETENT TEACHERS.

V.

1.

Financial awards based on performance would improve
the performance of incompetent .teachers.

[31

[2]

[ 11

[01

[-1J

[-21

[-31

2.

Failure to receive merit-pay awards would cause
incompetent teachers to seek ways to improve
their performance.

[31

[2]

[ 11

[0]

[-1J

[-2J

(-31

3.

Failure to receive merit-pay awards would cause
Incompetent teachers to leave the teaching profession.

C3J

£21

[11

[OJ

C-1J

[-21

!-31

4.

Teacher competency is the most critical Issue
bearing on educational productiveness in the schools.

[31

[21

[1]

[OJ

(-11

[-21

[-3]

5.

Financial awards based on the acquisition of new
knowledge and Improvement ot teaching ski I Is would
improve the performance of incompetent teachers.

[31

!21

[ 11

[QJ

[-1]

[-21

[-31

6.

Guidance and supervision by effective teachers would
Improve the performance of incompetent teachers.

£31

[21

£11

!OJ

[-11

!-21

!-31

7.

Incompetent teachers should be removed from the
classroom and placed in teacher development
programs until determined able to return to
the classroom.

[3]

!21

[ 11

[01

[-11

[-21

[-31

8.

Dismissal would be the only appropriate action to
be taken with regards to Incompetent teachers.

!31

[2]

[1]

101

[-11

[-21

[-31

SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED
TO MERIT-PAY IMPLEMENTATION.
1.

School administrators would establish policies ·and
procedures simple enough tor teachers to see the
direct relationship between merit-pay Increases
and performance.

!31

£21

£11

!OJ

£-11

£-21

C-31

2.

School administrators would maintain lines of
communications that allow teachers to provide input
about the reasonableness and equity of performance
expectations.

£31

£21

!11

!01

£-11

C-21

t-31

3.

School administrators would establish quotas
limiting the number of teachers that would
receive merit-pay awards.

[31

[21

[ 11

[0]

!-11

[-21

(-31

4.

Schoo I· administrators wou Id accept performance
failures as their ultimate responsibility.

[3]

!21

[ 1l

[OJ

!-11

!-21

!-31

5.

School administrators would maintain merit-pay
programs in which teachers contribute to the
design and administration of the program.

[3]

[21

!11

(0]

!-1 l

!-2]

[-3]

3

6.

School administrators would maintain a committment
to spend the time and effort necessary to maintain
an effective merit-pay program.

(3]

[2]

[ 11

[01

{-11

[-21

{·

7.

School administrators would be committed to
excellence through the concerted effort to
assure that only competent performance is rewarded.

£31

£21

[11

[0]

[-11

[-21

{-

a.

School administrators would distribute merit-pay
awards on the basis of the job requirements and
who fills the job rather than performance •

[3]

[21

[1]

[0]

{-1]

[-21

[-2

.9.

School administrators would set merit-pay rates
and redefine performance expectations In order
to control the amount of compensation to be
received by teachers.

[3]

[21

£11

[01

£-11

[-21

[-3

School administrators would attempt to modify
teacher performance through the use of merit pay
rather than changing rules, management practices,
or the job.

[3]

£21

[1]

[0]

[-11

[-21

[-31

10.

Please answer the following questions by checking one response only.
1.

2.

3.

Which statement defines Merit Pay as you understand the concept.
a.

Teachers are awarded additional compensation by advancing to higher job classifications
as a result of professional improvement.

b.

Teachers are awarded additional compensation for extra duties, longer work year, and/or
serving In high priority locations.

c.

Teachers are awarded additional compensation for performance that exceeds acceptable
performance standards.

d.

Teachers are awarded additional compensation for guidance and supervision of other
teachers, and curriculum development in addition to assuming partial teaching
responsibilities.

e.

Don't know.

Which statement describes the effect merit pay implementation will have on interpersonal
relations In the schools.
a.

There will be no significant changes In the interpersonal relations among teachers.

b.

There will be increased ill-feelings, lack of cooperation, and a highly competitive
atmosphere that adversely effects teacher performance.

c.

There will be less animosity among teachers and performance gains will be noted
because high performing teachers wll I be identified and rewarded appropriately.

d.

Don't know

You are:

male

female

4 •

'1ENTS:

4

Your age i s:
20-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
Over 60

APPENDIX III
LISTING OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS
DRAWN FOR THE STUDY

1'39
CALIFORNIA SCHOOL DISTRICTS PARTICIPATING
IN THE STUDY
The following school districts were drawn from regional
lists provided by the Association of California School
Administrators, ACSA Headquarters, Burlingame, California.
Region 1

Region 10

Trinity Union High
Susanville Elementary
Canyon Union Elementary

Soquel Elementary
Monterey Peninsula Unified
Mission Union Elementary

Region 2

Region 11

Placer Union High
Palmero Union Elementary
Golden Feather Union Elem.

Lemoore Union High
Muroc Unified
Taft Union High
Pioneer Union Elementary

Region 3
Grant Joint Union High
Esparto Unified
Region 4
Old Adobe Union Elem.
Santa Rosa HSD
Petaluma Joint Union High
Region 5
Belmont Elementary
Sequoia Union High
South San Francisco Unified
Region 7
Ripon Unified
Hughson Unified
Tracy City Schools
Lincoln Unif<iied

Region 12
Beaumont Unified
Elsinore Union High
Romoland Elementary
Region 13
College Elementary
Ventura Unified
Solvang Elementary
Region 14
Manhattan Beach Elementary
South Bay Union High
Hermosa Beach City Elem.
Region 15
Little Lake City Elem.
Hacienda La Puente Unified
Valle Lindo Elementary

Region 8
Lorna Prieta Joint Union
Elementary
Gilroy Unified
Morgan Hill Unified
Mt. Pleasant Elem.
Region 9
Washington Joint Union
Elementary
Clovis Unified

Region 17
Huntington Beach Union High
Capistrano Unified
Region 18
Carlsbad Unified
Central Union High

